GHamel《公司的核心竞争力》(中英对照

1990年普拉哈拉德(C.K.Prahalad)和哈默尔(G.Hamel)在哈佛商业评论上发表?企业核心竞争力?(TheCoreCompetenceoftheCorporation)

很多公司仍在苦苦寻找在全球竞争中克敌制胜的最有效方式。20世纪80年代，人们评价某个高管有没有才能，主要看这个人能否重组公司、拨乱反正和精简层级。然而，进入20世纪90年代后，人们评价高管时，将看他们有没有能力识别、培育和利用公司的核心竞争力(corecompetence，也称核心能力)，为公司的成长找到新的途径。看来，高管们该重新思考一下公司这个概念本身了。

让我们首先以美国的GTE*和日本的NEC**两家公司为例，探讨十年来它们各自的开展轨迹。20世纪80年代初期，信息技术已初显欣欣向荣的景象，GTE凭借自己的地位，极有希望成为该行业的主力军。这家公司在电信业非常活泼，其业务横跨多个领域，包括 、交换与传输系统、数字化专用自动小交换机(PABX)、半导体、分组交换、卫星、国防系统以及照明产品等等。此外，GTE旗下的娱乐产品集团(EntertainmentProductsGroup)，也就是喜万年(Sylvania)彩电的制造者，在相关的显示器技术领域也占有一席之地。1980年，GTE的销售额为99．8亿美元，净现金流17．3亿美元。与之相比，NEC当时还只是一个小字辈，销售收入仅为38亿美元。尽管拥有与GTE不相上下的技术根底和计算机业务，但NEC在电信领域尚无任何经验。

然而，到了1988年，NEC却后来者居上，销售额到达218．9亿美元，远远高于GTE公司的164．6亿美元。这时，GTE实际上已经沦为一家以经营 业务为主的公司，尽管它在国防和照明产品方面仍占有一席之地。这家公司的其他业务从全球的角度看已经变得很小。在过去的几年中，GTE公司已经把喜万年电视机和Telenet业务剥离了出去，把交换机、传输设备和数字PABX等产品转交给合资公司生产，而半导体业务那么已关张大吉。在这个过程中，GTE公司的国际地位一路下滑。1980到1988年间GTE在美国以外地区的销售收入从过去占总收入的20％降到了15％。

相比之下，NEC却一跃成为世界半导体工业的领导者，并且在电信产品和计算机领域也跻身一流企业。它稳固了自己在大型计算机方面的领先地位，还跨出了公用交换和传输领域，把触角伸到了 、 机和手提电脑等所谓的生活时尚产品(1ifestyleproducts)领域，在电信和办公自动化之间架起了桥梁。NEC成为惟一一家在电信、半导体、大型计算机三个领域的全球销售收入均名列前五位的公司。为什么这两家在起步时业务组合根本相近的公司，在几年后的表现却如此悬殊?主要是因为NEC能够从“核心竞争力〞的角度考虑企业问题，而GTEZ却没有。 对公司的重新思考

经营多元化公司曾经是一项很简单的工作，总部只需指示其业务单位把注意力放到某个特定的最终产品市场，并催促它们成为该领域的世界领先者即可。然而，随着市场边界的变化越来越快，目标开始变得飘忽不定，对目标市场的占领顶多只是暂时性的。但也有几家公司属于长袖善舞的一类，它们善于创造新市场，能够快速打入新兴市场并且在业已成熟的市场中大力改变客户的选择模式。这些公司自然成为大家效仿和学习的对象。对于公司的管理层来说，关键任务就是使自己的组织能够在产品中参加令人无法抗拒的功能，或者更高明一些，创造出消费者需要但是还未曾想到过的产品。

这项任务的艰巨性超乎我们的想像。最终，只有从根本上改变大型公司的管理才能完成这项任务。首先，西方企业的高层领导需要为竞争力的下降承当责任。人们或许会把竞争力下降归咎于高利率、日本的保护主义、过时的反托位斯法、爱闹事的工会以及缺乏耐性的投资者。但是，另一方面，人们却较难意识到或者羞于成认这样一个事实：政治上或者宏观经济上的“救济〞并不会给公司提供多少动力。其实是西方管理的理论和实践在拖我们的后腿，真正需要改革的是我们在管理中遵循的原那么。

像许多其他的比照案例一样，NEC与GTE之间的比拟可以给我们很多启迪。我们旨在通过这些比照分析来了解争夺全球领先地位所依靠的根底发生了什么变化。早在20世纪70年代初期，NEC公司的管理层就清楚地说明了把计算机与通信技术相融合的战略意图(strategicintent)，即所谓的“C&C〞

(Computer&Communication，计算机与通信)。NEC公司的领导认为，这一战略成功与否关键在于能否获得必要的核心竞争力，尤其是在半导体领域的核心竞争力。该公司的管理层采纳了一个适宜的战略架构(strategicarchitecture)，将其简称为C&C，然后在70年代中期将其意图传达给了整个组织以及外界人士。 NEC公司成立了一个由高层经理组成的“计算机与通信委员会〞，以指导核心产品与核心竞争力的开发。此外，NEC还打破了各项业务的利益界限，建立了一些协调小组和协调委员会。按照其战略架构，NEC把大量的资源调配到元件和中央处理器工程上，以加强公司在该领域的地位。它通过相互协作方式使得公司的内部资源成倍增长，借此积累起了多方面的核心竞争力。

NEC仔细地辨明了三种相互关联的技术和市场开展潮流。管理层认为，计算技术将从大型主机架构向分布式处理转变，元件将从简单的集成电路(1C)开展为“超大规模集成电路〞(VLSl)，通信方面那么从机械式纵横交换机演化为复杂的数字传输系统，即我们所说的ISDN(综合业务数字网)。随着形势进一步开展，NEC认为，计算、通信和元件业务将逐渐重叠和交织在一起，以至于最后很难将它们区分开来。如果一家公司具备了效劳于这三个市场的核心竞争力，那么到那时，必然会获得巨大的商机。

NEC的高层领导决定把半导体列为公司最重要的“核心产品〞

(coreproduct)。它随后与很多公司结成了战略联盟，到1987年联盟数量已到达100多个，其目的就是为了以低本钱快速构建企业的核心竞争力。在大型主机领域，NEC最著名的合作伙伴是美国的霍尼韦尔公司(Honeywell)与法国的Bull公司。在半导体元件领域，几乎所有的合作工程都是以获取技术为目的。在结盟时，NEC的运营经理对合作动机和目的非常明确：吸收和消化合作伙伴的技能。NEC的研发总监曾这样总结20世纪70年代和80年代获取技能的经历：“从投资角度分析，这种方式使我们能够以更低的本钱迅速掌握国外技术。我们没有必要自己开发新的创意。〞

而GTE似乎并没有如此明确的战略意图和战略架构。尽管高层决策者也曾讨论过信息技术的开展将带来怎样的影响，但对于在信息技术行业竞争将需要什么样的能力(competencies)，并没有形成一致的观点，更谈不上将其在公司中广泛传播了。虽然公司做了大量工作来确认关键技术，但高层业务经理依然我行我素，仿佛他们经营的业务单元与别的单元毫不相干。权力分散导致公司无法集中开展核心竞争力。相反，各业务单元越来越依靠外面的公司来获得关键技能，而对外合作那么成了一种分阶段退出的途径。今天，在新的管理层上台后，GTE已重新定位，要把自己的能力应用于电信效劳领域的新兴市场。

竞争优势的根源

NEC和GTE两家公司的差异在于，前者把自己看成是一些能力的组合，而后者那么把自己视为一些业务的组合。这类情形在很多行业屡见不鲜。从1980年到1988年，日本的佳能公司(Canon)增长了264％，本田公司(Honda)增长了200％。相比之下，美国的施乐(xerox)与克莱斯勒(Chrysler)那么落了下风，如果说西方的经理们以前是为日本进口货的价廉质高而忧心忡忡，那么他们现在恐怕要为对手在创造新市场、创造新产品和改良提高方面的惊人速度而慨叹了。佳能公司推出了个人复印机，本田把业务从摩托车扩展到了四轮越野车，索尼(Sony)开发出了8毫米的摄像机，雅玛哈(Yamaha)推出了数字钢琴，小松公司(Komatsu)研制了水下遥控推土机，而卡西欧(Casio)的最新产品那么是一种小屏幕彩色液晶电视机。谁曾预料得到会演化出这样一些前卫产品市场?

在较为成熟的市场上，日本公司的挑战也同样令人不安。它们掀起了一场改良产品特点和功能的风暴，把尖端的技术引入到了人们的日用品中。比方，日本汽车制造商率先尝试了四轮驱动、每缸四汽阀发动机，车内导航系统以及尖端的电子引擎管理系统。佳能凭借其产品的性能，在 机、台式激光打印机甚至半导体生产设备等市场都谋得了一席之地。

在短期内，一个公司的竞争优势源于现有产品的性价比特性。但是在第一轮全球竞争中存活下来的企业，无论是西方公司还是日本公司，现在都已趋向于采用相似的严格的产品本钱和质量标准。到达这些标准实际上已经成为继续留在竞争队伍中的最低要求，它们对于形成差异化优势的重要性已越来越小。从长期来看，竞争优势将取决于企业能否以比对手更低的本钱和更快的速度构建核心竞争力，这些核心竞争力将为公司催生出意想不到的产品。管理层有能力把整个公司的技术和生产技能整合成核心竞争力，使各项业务能够及时把握不断变化的机遇，这才是优势的真正所在。

有些高层经理宣称他们无法打造核心竞争力，因为业务单元的自主性是不可侵犯的，或者因为他们被紧张的季度预算束缚住了手脚。这些人应该反省。在很多西方企业中，问题并不是领导层在能力上逊于日本同行，或者企业的技术能力比日本公司差一大截，而是这些企业的管理层死抱着一个陈旧的公司概念。这个陈旧的概念，限制了业务部门的能力，使它们无法充分利用很多欧美公司所拥有的技术能力宝藏。

多元化公司就好比一棵大树，树干和几个主要枝杈是核心产品，较纤细的树枝那么是业务单元，叶、花与果实那么属于最终产品。为大树提供养分和起支撑固定作用的根系就是公司的核心竞争力。如果你只通过看最终产品来评价竞争对手的实力，你就会看走眼，好比你只看树叶来判断树的强壮程度一样。

核心竞争力是组织内的集体学习能力，尤其是如何协调各种生产技能并且把多种技术整合在一起的能力。索尼的微型化能力和飞利浦(Philips)的光介质专长就是两种核心竞争力。虽然在理论上可以把收音机组装在一个芯片上，但这种理论知识并不能确保公司有能力生产出如名片般大小的微型收音机。为了把设想变为现实，卡西欧必须把公司在微型化、微处理器设计、材料科学和超薄精密封装等方面的技术专长融为一体，这些也正是它在微型名片式计算器、袖珍电视机以及数字手表中所采用的技术。

核心竞争力不仅仅是整合各种技术，同时它还意味着对工作进行组织和提供价值。索尼公司的核心竞争力之一是微型化。为了使产品实现微型化，索尼必须保证技术专家、工程师和市场营销人员对客户需求达成共识，并了解技术上的可

能性。核心竞争力的作用不仅在制造业中表现明显，在效劳业中也是。花旗集团(Citicorp)率先投资了一套运营系统，这套系统使它能够全天24小时介入全世界的市场，由此带来的核心竞争力使花旗脱颖而出，把很多金融效劳公司甩在身后。 核心竞争力是沟通，是参与，是对跨越组织界限协同工作的深度承诺。它涉及所有职能部门和很多级别的员工。世界级的研究工程，比方激光或陶瓷的研发工作，能够在公司的实验室中开展，但是不会对公司的任何业务部门产生影响。因此，组合在一起构成公司核心竞争力的各种技能，必定是聚集在思维开阔的人身上。如果目光狭窄的话，人们就不会意识到他们有时机把别人的专长以新颖的方式与自己的专长结合到一起。

核心竞争力并不会随着使用的增多而减少。有形资产会随着时间的流逝而减损，但核心竞争力却会随着应用和共享的增多而增强。但是，核心竞争力也需要培养和保护，因为知识不用就会消亡。核心竞争力是把现有业务维系在一起的黏合剂。它们也是新业务开发的动力。多元化经营和进军新市场或许也要以它们为依据，而不仅仅是看市场的吸引力。

以3M公司的黏性胶带业务为例。在规划多元化业务(包括报事贴、磁带、照相胶卷、压敏胶带和砂带)的过程中，该公司运用了在基底、涂层以及黏合剂等产品中广泛共享的技术能力，并设计了各种方法来组合它们。实际上，3M公司对这些技术的投资一直没有间断过。尽管它的业务组合看起来极为分散，但是繁杂表象的背后却是少数几项共享的核心竞争力。

比照之下，有些大公司虽然具有打造核心竞争力的潜能，却没有成功，因为高层管理者仅把公司看做互不相干的业务集合。美国的通用电气公司(GE)把很大一局部电子消费品业务卖给了法国的汤姆森公司(Thomson)，声称在该领域中保持竞争优势已经日益艰难。事实确实如此，然而，令人不解的是，通用电气为这几项关键业务相中的买主竟然是几家在核心竞争力方面早已成了领袖的竞争对手——例如生产小型电机的百得公司(Black&Decker)和电子厂商汤姆森公司，后者正急于在微电子领域建立自己的核心竞争力，并且在日本公司的启发下，认识到在电子消费晶领域确立地位是打造这种核心竞争力的关键。

那些陷入战略事业部(strategicbusinessunit，SBU)思维模式的管理者们几乎无一例外地发现，公司中的各个业务部门已经离不开外部供给商所提供的必要元件，比方发动机和压缩机。但公司不能把这些产品仅仅看成是普通元件，而应该将其视为能够给各种最终产品带来竞争力的核心产品，它们是核心竞争力的具体表达。

核心竞争力不是什么

如今，各大公司都在竞相构筑自己的核心竞争力，以赢得国际领先地位，成功的公司已经不再把自己视为各个产品事业部的集合。从外表上看，佳能、本田、卡西欧以及NEC的各项业务似乎跨度很大，并且这些业务在客户、分销渠道以及营销策略上毫不相关。确实，有时候它们拥有的业务组合看起来是比拟特异，比方，NEC公司是世界上惟一在计算机、电信和半导体三个领域中销售额均名列前茅的公司，同时它的电子消费晶业务也经营得有声有色。

然而，外表现象往往具有欺骗性。其实，在NEC，数字技术，尤其是超大规模集成和系统集成技术是其根本。貌似散乱的业务在公司的核心竞争力中找到了统一的支点。同样，本田在汽车、摩托车、割草机以及发电机领域具有独特的竞争优势，是因为它具有在发动机和动力传动系统方面的核心竞争力。佳能在光学、影像与微处理器控制领域的核心竞争力，使它可以顺利进入甚至垄断复印机、激

光打印机、照相机以及图像扫描仪等诸多市场。飞利浦公司为了完善其光介质技术(激光视盘)几乎花费了15年的时间，而JVC为了在录像机领域取得领先地位也投入了大量的精力。其他可列入核心竞争力的还有机电工程(把机械工程与电子工程结合在一起)、视频显示技术、生物工程以及微电子技术等。在建立核心竞争力的早期阶段，飞利浦当时也不曾预料到在光介质的核心竞争力上可以派生出如此多的产品。同样，JVC在着手开发录像带技术时也未曾想到，最终的产品会有微型摄像机。

与争夺全球领先地位的品牌之战不同的是，打造世界一流的核心竞争力是一场无形的战斗。前者在世界各地的播送电视和平面媒体中随处可见，其目的是争夺全球性的“头脑份额〞(share ofmind)，而后者那么是无形的，除非有意寻找。西方公司的高层领导经常跟踪竞争对手产品的本钱和质量，然而，他们之中有多少人理清过日本人为了以低本钱获得核心竞争力而编织成的联盟网络?西方公司都想成为国际上的领先者，但是又有多少个董事会曾就相关的核心竞争力达成过明确一致的意见?又有多少高层领导曾经讨论过业务单元层面和总公司层面竞争战略的关键不同之处?

让我们明确一点，培养核心竞争力并不是说必须在研发投入上超过对手。以销售数量计，1983年，佳能复印机在全球市场上的份额超过了施乐，但佳能在复印技术上的研发预算却只占施乐的很小一局部。过去20年来，NEC的研发开支占其销售收入的比例几乎比每个欧美同行都少。

核心竞争力也不是指本钱分摊(shared costs)，即让两个以上的战略事业部共用同一设施——工厂、效劳设施或者销售队伍，或者采用同样的元件。本钱分摊确实会产生很大的效益，但本钱分摊是在业务单位已经出现后，为了合理组织生产而采取的事后行动。建立核心竞争力那么要事先规划，然后才会衍生出业务单位。

此外，建立核心竞争力也与纵向一体化不同，前者的目标更加远大。通常，经理人在做自造还是购置(make orbuy)决定之前，都要先从最终产品出发，对上游的供给链效率、下游的分销渠道以及客户进行分析。他们并不需要列出一张技能清单，并展望着以非常规的方式运用这些技能。(当然，打造核心竞争力确实为纵向一体化提供了理由。拿佳能来说，虽然它的复印机业务并不是特别的纵向一体化，但是在垂直供给链中的某些方面，由于对核心竞争力有支持作用，佳能也会采取一些纵向一体化的措施)。 核心竞争力确实定与丧失

至少有三种检验方法可以用来确定公司的核心竞争力。首先，核心竞争力能够为公司进入多个市场提供方便。举例来说，显示器系统方面的核心竞争力能够使一家公司涉足计算器、微型电视机、手提电脑显示屏以及汽车仪表盘等广泛的业务领域，这就是卡西欧公司进军手持式电视机市场缺乏为奇的原因。第二，核心竞争力应当对最终产品为客户带来的可感知价值有重大奉献。显然，本田公司的发动机专长满足了这个条件。

最后一点，核心竞争力应当是竞争对手难以模仿的。如果核心竞争力是各项技术和生产技能的复杂的融合，那么这项能力就难以被竞争对手模仿。竞争对手或许能够获得核心竞争力中的几种技术，但是要复制其内部协调与学习的整体模式却非常困难。在20世纪60年代初期，JVC决定致力于录像带技术方面的核心竞争力，这个核心竞争力就通过了我们上述的三项检验。20世纪70年代末美国的RCA公司决心开发以唱针为根底的视频转动式系统，这个工程那么不能通过上述三

项检验。

几乎没有公司能够打造5到6种世界一流的根本核心竞争力。如果一家公司列出20到30种能力(capa•bilities)，那么它列出的很可能就不是核心竞争力。当然，列出这样一个清单并且把这些技能视为构建核心竞争力的根底不失为一种好的做法。接下来，你可以通过签订许可协议和建立联盟来获得核心竞争力中缺少的组成局部，这会使你的本钱大大降低。

大多数西方企业几乎从未从这些方面考虑竞争力，现在该是这些公司认真研究这样做有何风险的时候了。倘假设主要根据最终产品的性价比来判断自己或者对手的竞争力，实质上会破坏自己的核心竞争力，或者说对于增强自己的核心竞争力几乎没有帮助。要知道，能够催生出下一代有竞争力产品的根本技能，不能通过外包和贴牌生产(OEM)“租进来〞。照我们看，很多公司舍弃“本钱中心〞，转向外部供给商以便削减内部投资的举动非常不明智，它们这样做实际上是把自己的核心竞争力拱手送给了别人。

以克莱斯勒为例，与本田不同，它把发动机和动力传动系统仅仅视为普通元件。这家公司现在变得日益依靠三菱(Mitsubishi)与现代(Hyundai)。1985年—1987年，它外包的发动机从252，000台增加到了382,000台。想像一下，换了本田，它会轻易把如此关键的汽车部件拱手让给他人去生产吗?更不必说设计工作了。这就是为什么本田对一级方程式赛车如此投入的原因。虽然本田的研发预算少于通用汽车(GM)以及丰田(Toyota)，但是它能够把各种与发动机相关的技术整合到一起，并且将它们充分地转化为整个公司的核心竞争力，从而开发出世界上首屈一指的产品。

当然，完全有可能的是，一家在核心竞争力开发方面不及别人的公司也会暂时拥有竞争力强的产品线。比方，如果一家公司现在欲进入复印机市场，它会发现将有十几家日本公司等在那里，迫不及待地要为它从事贴牌生产。然而，一旦根底技术发生变化，或者它的供给商也决定直接进军该市场并成为它的强劲对手，那么这家公司的产品线，及其在市场和分销渠道上所做的投资就将变得岌岌可危。虽然外包能迅速使你获得竞争力强的产品，但是它对于打造有助于保持产品领先地位的内在技能却奉献甚微。

同样，如果一家公司尚未决定在哪个方面打造核心竞争力，它就不可能制定出明智的联盟或者采购战略。显然，日本公司已经从联盟中获益。它们通过联盟的方式从西方合作伙伴那里学到了很多，这些西方公司显然没有尽心尽力去保护自己的核心竞争力。正如我们以前曾经谈到过的，在联盟中学习需要公司积极地投入一系列资源，包括差旅、一群敬业的员工、试验性设备、消化和验证所学内容需要的时间。如果一家公司没有建设核心竞争力的明确目标，它也许不会做出这样的投入。

此外，如果公司在现有业务中估计到达了40％，但是其最终产品的品牌份额，不管是空调还是冰箱，都非常小。

由于全球竞争在不同的层面上遵循的规那么不同，争夺的利益也不同，所以分清核心竞争力、核心产品以及最终产品非常重要。为了长期建立或者稳固领先地位，公司很可能要在各个层面都成为胜利者。在核心竞争力层面，公司的目标是在某个具体类别的产品功能的设计和开发方面谋取世界领先地位，比方在光盘数据的存储和检索(比方飞利浦的光介质技术能力)，或者体积的紧凑性和使用的方便性(比方索尼的微型发动机和微处理器控制装置)方面领先全球。

为了保住核心竞争力的领先地位，这些公司都力图使核心产品在世界上的制

造份额到达最大。核心产品往往拥有各种各样的内部和外部客户，从事核心产品制造带来的销售收入和市场反应至少局部地决定了核心竞争力改良和扩展的速度。正是出于这种考虑，20世纪70年代中期，JVC决定与欧美领先的电子消费品公司建立录像机的供货关系。在为法国的汤姆森公司、英国的索恩公司，德国的德律风根公司(Telefunken)，以及美国的合作伙伴供货的过程中，JVC获得了现金并积累了多方面的市场经验，这使得JVC最终超过了竞争对手飞利浦与索尼。(虽然飞利浦与JVC同时开发了录像带技术，但由于它没有建立世界性的OEM网络，所以无法通过销售核心产品来加快录像带技术能力的改良和完善)

JVC的成功之道为韩国公司所效仿，像金星(Goldstar)、三星(Samsung)、起亚(Kia)以及大宇(Daewoo)等韩国制造商也是通过与欧美公司签订OEM合同来建立自己在显示器、半导体以及汽车发动机等各种核心产品领域的领先地位。它们对外公开宣称自己的目标是把投资工程从潜在竞争对手，多半是美国公司手中夺过来。这种做法使它们能够在掏空对手的同时，加快核心竞争力的建设。亚洲公司通过专注于核心竞争力的建设并且把它们注入到核心产品中，在元件市场上已经积累了优势。接着，它们又利用优越的核心产品向下游进军，以谋得自己的品牌份额。它们不大可能永远只停留在做低本钱供给商上。随着品牌声誉的提升，它们的价格也可能会提升。本田的豪华车Acura就已经证明了这一点，其他的日本汽车制造商也在打同样的牌。

控制核心产品如此关键还有其他的原因。如果一家公司在核心产品市场占据了主导地位，它就有能力影响相关应用领域与最终产品的开展。诸如数据驱动器、激光器之类与CD相关的核心产品，就使得索尼和飞利浦能够影响计算机光存储外设的开展。随着核心产品向更多的应用领域挺进，公司在新产品开发上能够不断减少本钱、缩短时间和降低风险。简而言之，定位准确的核心产品可以带来规模经济和范围经济(economiesofscope)。 战略事业部的专制

如果我们拘泥于20年前设计的用来管理多元化公司的分析工具，是无法理解新竞争态势下出现的新概念和新术语的。当时的竞争根本上是在国内展开(比方，通用电气对西屋，通用汽车对福特等)，所有的主要竞争对手说的都是来自同一批商学院和咨询公司的语言。但是，老药方会有潜在的毒副作用。那些把战略事业部作为惟一组织形式的公司尤其需要新的思维方式。副栏“两种公司概念：战略事业部或者核心竞争力〞总结了两种公司概念的含义。

显然，多元化企业拥有一系列的产品组合和业务组合。但是，我们认为企业也应被视为能力的组合。美国企业并不缺少用来打造核心竞争力的技术资源，但是美国企业的管理层常常缺乏打造核心竞争力的远见，并且缺少有效的管理手段来整合分散在多个业务部门的资源。一旦管理层转变了工作重心，那么多元化的模式、技能的准备和调用、资源的分配以及联盟和外包的方式都不可防止地会受到影响。

我们谈到过全球竞争的三个层面：核心竞争力、核心产品以及最终产品。企业必须了解自己在每个层面上的输赢状况。仅仅通过加大投资力度，一家企业也许会在某些根底科学技术上领先对手。尽管如此，它或许仍然会输掉争夺核心竞争力领导地位的竞赛。相反，如果一家企业能够在打造核心竞争力方面赢得竞赛，而不是在少数几项技术上领先，它几乎必定会在新业务开发上胜过对手。如果企业的核心产品在世界上的制造份额能够领先对手，那么它很有可能在提高产品的功能和性价比上胜过对手。

由于产品的市场份额未必能反映公司内在的多种竞争力，所以我们很难通过这类指标来确定公司在最终产品的竞争中到底是赢还是输。事实上，如果企业试图依靠别人的竞争力来获得市场份额，而不愿意把力气花在核心竞争力和核心产品的开发上，那么就好比踩在危险的流沙上。在全球品牌大战中，3M、百得、佳能、本田、NEC以及花旗集团等通过从核心竞争力中派生出来的各种产品，为自己撑起了全球性的品牌伞(brandumbrella)。这使它们下辖的各个事业部能够树立产品形象、赢得客户忠诚并顺利进入分销渠道。

当你重新思考公司的概念时，目前一统天下的战略事业部——这个曾经影响了一代人的组织结构教条，显然已不合时宜。在战略事业部已成信条的地方，任何人对分权稍有异议都会被斥为异端。在很多公司，狭隘的战略事业部观点意味着高层管理人员只能看到全球竞争的一个层面，那就是争取把具有竞争力的产品今天就放到货架上。这种扭曲的认识会造成怎样的后果?

核心竞争力和核心产品的开发投入严重缺乏。当组织被视为战略事业部的集合时，其中任何一个事业部都不会单独承当起做强做大核心产品的职责，也无法提出充足的理由获得必要的投资来打造某种世界领先的核心竞争力。由于总部管理层不能把更为全面的视角传到达战略事业部，事业部的经理倾向于少投资。最近，柯达和飞利浦等公司已经意识到这个问题，并开始寻找新的组织形式，以使它们能够为内外客户开发和生产核心产品。

在欧美企业中，战略事业部的经理们看竞争对手的方式与看自己的方式是一样的。总的来讲，他们没有意识到亚洲企业对谋取核心产品领先地位的重视，或者不知道在制造业中保持世界领先地位与维持核心竞争力的开发速度之间存在着重要联系。他们既没有把握代工生产的时机，也没有在自己的各产品分部之间寻找协调整合的时机。

资源受到禁锢。随着战略事业部的开展，它会逐渐积累起自己独特的能力。一般而言，蕴涵这些能力的员工会被看做该事业部独有的资产。其他事业部的经理如果想借用这些人员很可能会碰钉子。事业部的经理们不仅不愿意把怀揣独特能力的人才外借出去，也许还要把他们隐藏起来，防止公司在开发新业务时把他们调走，这好比不兴旺地区的居民把大局部现金藏到床垫下一样。核心竞争力与货币一样，其效用的大小不仅取决于公司有多少存量，还取决于其流通速度。 在技能储藏方面，西方企业通常都具有优势。但它们是否能够快速地重新配置这些技能以响应新的机遇呢?虽然日本的佳能，NEC和本田在构成核心竞争力的技术和人才储藏上逊色于欧美企业，但是它们却能以更快的速度把资源在事业部之间调进调出。公司总部的研发支出不能完全反映佳能的核心竞争力储藏规模。并且，如果不仔细观察，你也根本无从判断佳能调动核心竞争力以把握商机的速度有多快。

一旦能力被禁锢，掌握着关键能力的员工就无法参加充满机遇的工程，而他们的技能也就逐渐退化和萎缩。只有充分利用核心竞争力，像佳能这样的小型公司才能与施乐这样的行业巨头相抗衡。令人奇怪的是，在制订公司预算时全力争夺资金的战略事业部经理，却不情愿争夺人才这种公司最珍贵的资产。我们看到公司的高层领导往往倾注大量的精力做资本预算，但是对于分配人力资源似乎漠不关心，殊不知后者才是核心竞争力的真正表达。企业高管中几乎没有人能够走下四五个职级，去发现具有关键能力的人才，并跨越组织界限调配他们。

创新受到限制。在没有找出核心竞争力的情况下，各战略事业部只会追求手边的创新时机，比方，没有多少新意的产品线延伸或者地理上的扩张。而那些属

于混合业务的时机，比方 机、手提电脑、手持式电视机和便携式键盘乐器等等就会被无视，除非经理们摘掉他们的事业部眼罩。记住，当佳能准备进军复印机市场大展身手时，它给外界的印象是经营照相机业务的公司。显然，从核心竞争力的角度对企业进行思考，能够拓宽创新的领域。 战略架构的制定

在一家多元化公司中，如果信息系统、沟通模式、职业开展道路、管理层报酬以及战略制定流程都受制于战略事业部的组织界限，那么其核心竞争力就必然是支离破碎的。因此，我们认为，高层管理人员应该把大量时间放在制定公司战略架构上，从而确定打造核心竞争力的目标。战略架构是未来的路线图，它指明需要培养哪些核心竞争力以及这些核心竞争力是由哪些相关技术组成的。

战略架构可以鼓励组织不断从联盟关系中学习新的知识和技能，并且帮助组织确定内部开发的重点，因此公司为获得未来市场领先地位所需要的投资就可以大幅节省。NEC的计算机与通信战略架构就是一例。如果一家公司不清楚应当培育怎样的核心竞争力，或者不知道哪些核心竞争力应该严加保护以免被无意转移，它怎么可能明智地选择合作伙伴?

当然，所有这些都应当归结为设计什么样的战略架构这个问题。答案因公司而异。回到我们前面提到的那个树的比喻，公司是围绕核心产品而最终是围绕核心竞争力来组织的，为了根系的足够强壮，公司必须答复一些最根本的问题：如果不能有效地控制这种核心竞争力，我们能够在多长时间内保持我们的竞争优势?这种核心竞争力对客户能够感知到的产品价值有什么重大意义?假设失去这种核心竞争力，我们将会在未来丧失哪些商机?

战略架构为产品和市场的多元化提供了理由。战略事业部经理必须面对这样的问题：新的市场时机是否会有助于实现公司的总体目标——成为世界一流企业?它是否利用或者增强了公司的核心竞争力?比方在威格士(Vickers)公司，在判断有关多元化的选择决定时，要考虑这个决定是否有助于使该公司成为世界上最好的动力和运动控制公司。(参见副栏“威格士公司体会到战略架构的价值〞) 战略架构必须把资源分配的优先顺序清清楚楚地摆在整个组织的面前。它为最高管理层提供了一个资源分配决策的模板。它可以帮助级别较低的经理们理解为何要确立这样的资源分配主次关系，同时对高层管理者也有约束作用——使他威格士公司体会到战略架构的价值在大多数美国公司中，高层管理人员应当为获取和配置核心竞争力而制定公司战略的想法还属于比拟新的观念。但也有例外。Trinova是总部设在俄亥俄州托雷多(Toledo)的一家公司，在动力和运动控制器以及工程塑料的全球市场上占有重要地位。威格士公司是其最主要的业务单元之一，它是生产液压元件的一流厂家，其产品包括阀门、泵、作动器以及过滤器等器具，分别应用于航空、航海、国防、汽车。土方机械以及工业市场等。

威格士公司意识到．如果把电子学科领域的应用与自己的传统技术相结合，那么自己的传统业务很可能会发生巨大的转变。公司的目标是“确保技术领域的变革不会导致客户抛弃威格士〞。可见，这一举动的初衷是自我防御。威格士意识到，如果不获取新的技能就不能保护现有的市场，也不能抓住新的增长机遇。威格士公司的经理们试着把思考的重点放在以下三个方面的演化上：

(1)与动力和运动控制业务相关的技术，(2)能够满足客户新需求的功能，(3)创造性地管理“技术+客户需求〞所需的核心竞争力。

尽管面临短期赢利压力，最高管理层还是做了一个10-15年的长期规划，其中涉及可能出现的新的客户需求、不断变化的技术，以及使二者匹配所需的核心

竞争力。它的口号是“迈向21世纪〞。威格士公司目前的主营业务是液压动力元件。而战略架构图又确认了另外两种核心竞争力：电力元件和电子控制。把硬件、软件以及效劳结合起来的系统整合能力也是公司的开发目标。

战略架构并不只是对某种具体产品或者具体技术的预测，而是一种更宏观的规划，它揭示了客户对功能的要求、潜在技术与核心竞争力这三者之间不断开展的关系。这种战略架构隐含的一个假设是，我们不可能对产品和系统的未来进行明确的界定，然而，要想在开发新市场方面先发制人，竞争者必须及早建设核心竞争力。威格士公司所制定的战略架构不仅从核心竞争力角度对未来进行了描述，而且也为当下的各种决策(重点产品、收购、联盟和招聘)奠定了根底。

从1986年起，威格士公司进行了十屡次目标明确的收购，每次收购对准的都是总体战略架构中所缺少的某种元件或技术。该架构也是公司内部开发新核心竞争力的根底。与此同时，威格士公司还进行了组织结构的重组，以方便电子电气能力和机械能力的整合。威格士公司不仅要制定战略架构图，还要向所有的员工、客户和投资者广泛宣传这一架构，同时建立与这个架构相应的管理系统。我们相信，再花两到三年的时间，威格士公司就能从这项投入中获得收益。们的决策保持一致。简单地讲，战略架构对公司及其市场都进行了定义。在这一点上，3M、威格士、NEC、佳能和本田都做得相当成功。当本田进军汽车市场时，它知道自己在利用从摩托车业务中所学到的东西——如何制造转速高、运转顺畅、重量轻的发动机。创立一个战略架构可迫使组织确定和开展跨事业部的技术联系和生产联系，而这些联系将为组织提供一种独特的竞争优势。

正是由于资源分配的一致性和与之相应的管理体系的建立，战略架构才变得具有活力，并且能创造出良好的管理文化、团队合作精神、变革能力，形成资源共享、专有技能受保护和长远思考的气氛。这也就是为什么特定的战略架构不可能轻易被竞争对手模仿的原因。战略架构同样也是公司与客户、与其他外部利益相关者沟通的工具。它在揭示大方向的同时，指明了具体的行动步骤。 人员的重新部署

如果公司的核心竞争力是其关键资源，并且最高管理层必须保证拥有核心竞争力的人才不被某个业务部所把持，那么自然而然地可以得出这样的结论：战略事业部必须像争取资金预算一样争取核心竞争力。我们曾经略微地谈过这个问题，鉴于这个问题非常重要，我们要谈得更加深入一些。

一旦最高管理层(在分部经理和战略事业部经理的协助下)确认了最为重要的核心竞争力，它就必须要求业务部门确认与这些能力密切相关的工程和人员。总部的管理者还应当指导相关部门对这些代表核心竞争力的人员做一次审核，确定他们的所在地、数量以及素质。

这就给中层经理们发出了一个重要信号：核心竞争力是整个公司的资源，理应由公司总部管理层重新进行调配。任何员工都不为某一个业务部门所单独占有。要把某些人才留在战略事业部发挥作用，该部门的经理必须证明这样做能够使公司对员工技能的投资获得最大的回报。如果在每年的战略规划或预算编制过程中，事业部经理必须给出合理的理由才能把这些拥有核心竞争力的人才保存在本部门中，那么公司实际上是在进一步强化这个信号。

佳能在光学技术上的核心竞争力分散在多个业务领域，包括照相机、复印机以及半导体光刻设备(参见副栏“佳能的核心竞争力〞)。当佳能发现数字激光打印机市场大有可为时，它授权该事业部的经理到其他事业部搜罗人才，以便建立业务所需的人才库。当佳能的复印产品部着手开发由微处理器控制的复印机时，

它自然而然地向照相产品部门求助，因为后者曾经开发了世界上第一台由微处理器控制的照相机。

然而，如果公司的奖酬体系仅仅以产品线的业绩为依据，或者职业开展的道路仅仅局限在事业部内部，那么各事业部经理的行为模式就会朝着破坏性竞争的方向开展。在NEC公司，下一代的核心竞争力是由各个业务分部的经理共同确定的。他们共同决定开发未来的每项核心竞争力需要多少投资，以及每个部门需要奉献多少资金和提供多少人力支持。这里还有一种公平交换的意味。也许会有某个分部比别的分部付出的更多或者得到的更少，但这种不公平只是暂时的，长期内终究会达成一种平衡。

还有，战略事业部经理的积极奉献应当在公司内部广为宣传。要知道，一个事业部经理不可能为了让其化事业的获得好处〔或者让作为晋升对手的其他事业部总经理受益)就同意把关键人才调出。有合作态度的事业部经理应该得到表扬，要肯定他们的团队精神。只要优先顺序是明晰的，人才的调动就不会被人们视为只是出于个人喜好或者政治考虑。

公司必须把这种为了打造核心竞争力而进行的人员调动记录存档，并予以肯定和重视。在部门的核心人才被调去开发其他领域的商机之后，有些业务部门的竞争力可能会暂时下降。如果因为业绩下降而立即遭到指责，那么下一次它们就不太可能再拱手交出珍贵的人才。

最后，公司可以采取一些措施消除骨干员工脑海中“我永远属于某个业务部〞的认识。在职业开展的早期阶段，公司可以仔细安排一个轮岗方案，让员工接触多种不同的业务。在佳能，关键人才会定期在照相机部和复印机部之间，以及复印机部和专业光学产品部之间流动。而在职业开展的中期阶段，就需要让这些关键人才定期到跨业务部门的工程小组中工作，一方面是为了传播核心竞争力，另一方面是为了防止员工与某个业务部门的联系过于紧密，导致他们无视别处有更吸引人的前景。这些拥有核心竞争力的员工应当知道，他们的职业开展是由公司总部的人力资源专家来跟踪和指导的。在20世纪80年代初期，佳能公司中所有30岁以下的工程师都曾收到邀请，让他们申请成为一个7人委员会的成员，该委员会将用两年的时间为佳能绘制未来的开展轨迹，其中包括战略架构。

所有具备核心竞争力的员工都应当定期聚集在一起，分享彼此的心得和体会。这样做的目的是为了在他们之间建立一种强烈的社区归属感。应该让他们忠诚于他们所代表的整个公司的核心竞争力，而不是某个特别的业务部。通过经常旅行、与客户交谈以及与同事会面，核心人才也许会受到鼓励去发现新的市场机遇。 核心竞争力是新业务开发的源泉。它们应当构成公司总部的战略重点。经理们必须在核心产品的制造方面赢得领先地位，同时通过旨在利用范围经济的晶牌建设方案获取全球份额。只有在企业被视为由核心竞争力、核心产品和专注于市场的业务单元这多个层面构成的组织时，它才适于战斗。

就最高管理层而言，他们不能只满足于成为最高级别的财务核算与汇总中心——尽管在权力高度分散的组织中这种情况经常会出现。公司高管人员应当通过说明战略架构来创造增加值，而战略架构将为公司谋求竞争力提供指导。我们相信，热衷于核心竞争力的建设，将是20世纪90年代全球竞争胜利者的一个重要特点，重新思考公司的概念刻不容缓。 pioupiou 回复日期：2005-10-3 10:53:18 The Core Competence Of the Corporation

by C.K. Prahalad and Gary Hamel

C. K. Prahalad is professor of corporate strategy and international business at the University of Michigan. Gary Hamel is lecturer in business policy and management at the London Business School. Their most recent HBR article, \"Strategic Intent\" (May June 1989), won the 1989 McKinsey Award for excellence. This article is based on research funded by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation.

The most powerful way to prevail in global competition is still invisible to many companies. During the 1980s, top executives were judged on their ability to restructure, declutter, and delayer their corporations. In the 1990s, they'll be judged on their ability to identify, cultivate, and exploit the core competencies that make growth possible indeed, they'll have to rethink the concept of the corporation itself.

Consider the last ten years of GTE and NEC. In the early 1980s, GTE was well positioned to become a major player in the evolving information technology industry. It was active in telecommunications. Its operations spanned a variety of businesses including telephones, switching and transmission systems, digital PABX, semiconductors, packet switching, satellites, defense systems, and lighting products. And GTE's Entertainment Products Group, which produced Sylvania color TVs, had a position in related display technologies. In 1980, GTE's sales were $9.98 billion, and net cash flow was $1.73 billion. NEC, in contrast, was much smaller, at $3.8 billion in sales. It had a comparable technological base and computer businesses, but it had no experience as an operating telecommunications company.

Yet look at the positions of GTE and NEC in 1988. GTE's 1988 sales were $16.46 billion, and NEC’s sales were considerably higher at $21.89 billion. GTE has, in effect, become a telephone operating company with a position in defense and lighting products. GTE's other businesses are small in global terms. GTE has divested Sylvania TV and Telenet, put switching, transmission, and digital PABX into joint ventures, and closed down semiconductors. As a result, the international position of GTE has eroded. Non U.S. revenue as a percent of total revenue dropped from 20% to 15% between 1980 and 1988.

NEC has emerged as the world leader in semiconductors and as a first tier player in telecommunications products and computers. It has consolidated its position in mainframe computers. It has moved beyond public switching and transmission to include such lifestyle products as mobile telephones, facsimile machines, and laptop computers bridging the

gap between telecommunications and office automation. NEC is the only company in the world to be in the top five in revenue in telecommunications, semiconductors, and mainframes. Why did these two companies, starting with comparable business portfolios, perform so differently? Largely because NEC conceived of itself in terms of \"core competencies,\" and GTE did not.

Rethinking the Corporation

Once, the diversified corporation could simply point its business units at particular end product markets and admonish them to become world leaders. But with market boundaries changing ever more quickly, targets are elusive and capture is at best temporary. A few companies have proven themselves adept at inventing new markets, quickly entering emerging markets, and dramatically shifting patterns of customer choice in established markets. These are the ones to emulate. The critical task for management is to create an organization capable of infusing products with irresistible functionality or, better yet, creating products that customers need but have not yet even imagined)

This is a deceptively difficult task. Ultimately, it requires radical change in the management of major companies. It means, first of all, that top managements of Western companies must assume responsibility for competitive decline. Everyone knows about high interest rates, Japanese protectionism, outdated antitrust laws, obstreperous unions, and impatient investors. What is harder to see, or harder to acknowledge, is how little added momentum companies actually get from political or macroeconomic \"relief.\" Both the theory and practice of Western management have created a drag on our forward motion. It is the principles of management that are in need of reform.

NEC versus GTE, again, is instructive and only one of many such comparative cases we analyzed to understand the changing basis for global leadership. Early in the 1970s, NEC articulated a strategic intent to exploit the convergence of computing and communications, what it called \"C&C\" Success, top management reckoned, would hinge on acquiring competencies, particularly in semiconductors. Management adopted an appropriate \"strategic architecture,\" summarized by C&C, and then communicated its intent to the whole organization and the outside world during the mid 1970s.

NEC constituted a \"C&C Committee\" of top managers to oversee the development of core products and core competencies. NEC put in place coordination groups and committees that cut across the interests of individual businesses. Consistent with its strategic architecture, NEC shifted enormous resources to strengthen its position in components and central processors. By using collaborative arrangements to multiply

internal resources, NEC was able to accumulate a broad array of core competencies.

NEC carefully identified three interrelated streams of technological and market evolution. Top management determined that computing would evolve from large mainframes to distributed processing, components from simple ICs to VLSI, and communications from mechanical cross bar exchange to complex digital systems we now call ISDN. As things evolved further, NEC reasoned, the computing, communications, and components businesses would so overlap that it would be very hard to distinguish among them, and that there would be enormous opportunities for any company that had built the competencies needed to serve all three markets.

NEC top management determined that semiconductors would be the company's most important \"core product.\" It entered into myriad strategic alliances over 100 as of 1987 aimed at building competencies rapidly and at low cost. In mainframe computers, its most noted relationship was with Honeywell and Bull. Almost all the collaborative arrangements in the semiconductor component field were oriented toward technology access. As they entered collaborative arrangements, NEC’s operating managers understood the rationale for these alliances and the goal of internalizing partner skills. NEC's director of research summed up its competence acquisition during the 1970s and 1980s this way: \"From an investment standpoint, it was much quicker and cheaper to use foreign technology. There wasn't a need for us to develop new ideas.〞 No such clarity of strategic intent and strategic architecture appeared to exist at GTE. Although senior executives discussed the implications of the evolving information technology industry, no commonly accepted view of which competencies would be required to compete in that industry were communicated widely. While significant staff work was done to identify key technologies, senior line managers continued to act as if they were managing independent business units. Decentralization made it difficult to focus on core competencies. Instead, individual businesses became increasingly dependent on outsiders for critical skills, and collaboration became a route to staged exits. Today, with a new management team in place, GTE has repositioned itself to apply its competencies to emerging markets in telecommunications services.

The Roots of Competitive Advantage

The distinction we observed in the way NEC and GTE conceived of themselves a portfolio of competencies versus a portfolio of businesses was repeated across many industries. From 1980 to 1988, Canon grew by 264%, Honda by 200%. Compare that with Xerox and Chrysler. And if Western managers were once anxious about the low cost and high quality of Japanese imports, they are now overwhelmed by the pace at which Japanese rivals are inventing

new markets, creating new products, and enhancing them. Canon has given us personal copiers; Honda has moved from motorcycles to four wheel off road buggies. Sony developed the 8mm camcorder, Yamaha, the digital piano. Komatsu developed an underwater remote controlled bulldozer, while Casio's latest gambit is a small screen color LCD television. Who would have anticipated the evolution of these vanguard markets?

In more established markets, the Japanese challenge has been just as disquieting. Japanese companies are generating a blizzard of features and functional enhancements that bring technological sophistication to everyday products. Japanese car producers have been pioneering four wheel steering, four valve-per cylinder engines, in car navigation systems, and sophisticated electronic engine management systems. On the strength of its product features, Canon is now a player in facsimile transmission machines, desktop laser printers, even semiconductor manufacturing equipment. In the short run, a company's competitiveness derives from the price/performance attributes of current products. But the survivors of the first wave of global competition, Western and Japanese alike, are all converging on similar and formidable standards for product cost and quality minimum hurdles for continued competition, but less and less important as sources of differential advantage. In the long run, competitiveness derives from an ability to build, at lower cost and more speedily than competitors, the core competencies that spawn unanticipated products. The real sources of advantage are to be found in management's ability to consolidate corporatewide technologies and production skills into competencies that empower individual businesses to adapt quickly to changing opportunities.

Senior executives who claim that they cannot build core competencies either because they feel the autonomy of business units is sacrosanct or because their feet are held to the quarterly budget fire should think again. The problem in many Western companies is not that their senior executives are any less capable than those in Japan nor that Japanese companies possess greater technical capabilities. Instead, it is their adherence to a concept of the corporation that unnecessarily limits the ability of individual businesses to fully exploit the deep reservoir of technological capability that many American and European companies possess.

The diversified corporation is a large tree. The trunk and major limbs are core products, the smaller branches are business units; the leaves, flowers, and fruit are end products. The root system that provides nourishment, sustenance, and stability is the core competence. You can miss the strength of competitors by looking only at their end products, in the same way you miss the strength of a tree if you look only at its leaves.

(See the chart \"Competencies: The Roots of Competitiveness.〞)

Core competencies are the collective learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and integrate multiple streams of technologies. Consider Sony's capacity to miniaturize or Philips's optical media expertise. The theoretical knowledge to put a radio on a chip does not in itself assure a company the skill to produce a miniature radio no bigger than a business card. To bring off this feat, Casio must harmonize know how in miniaturization, microprocessor design, material science, and ultrathin precision casing the same skills it applies in its miniature card calculators, pocket TVs, and digital watches.

If core competence is about harmonizing streams of technology, it is also about the organization of work and the delivery of value. Among Sony's competencies is miniaturization. To bring miniaturization to its products, Sony must ensure that technologists, engineers, and marketers have a shared understanding of customer needs and of technological possibilities. The force of core competence is felt as decisively in services as in manufacturing. Citicorp was ahead of others investing in an operating system that allowed it to participate in world markets 24 hours a day. Its competence in provided the company the means to differentiate itself from many financial service institutions.

Core competence is communication, involvement, and a deep commitment to working across organizational boundaries. It involves many levels of people and all functions. World class research in, for example, lasers or ceramics can take place in corporate laboratories without having an impact on any of the businesses of the company. The skills that together constitute core competence must coalesce around individuals whose efforts are not so narrowly focused that they cannot recognize the opportunities for blending their functional expertise with those of others in new and interesting ways. Core competence does not diminish with use. Unlike physical assets, which do deteriorate over time, competencies are enhanced as they are applied and shared. But competencies still need to be nurtured and protected; knowledge fades if it is not used. Competencies are the glue that binds existing businesses. They are also the engine for new business development. Patterns of diversification and market entry may be guided by them, not just by the attractiveness of markets.

Consider 3M's competence with sticky tape. in dreaming up businesses as diverse as \"Post it\" notes, magnetic tape, photographic film, pressure sensitive tapes, and coated abrasives, the company has brought to bear widely shared competencies in substrates, coatings, and adhesives and devised various ways to combine them. Indeed, 3M has invested consistently in them. What seems to be an extremely diversified portfolio of businesses belies a few shared core competencies.

In contrast, there are major companies that have had the potential to

build core competencies but failed to do so because top management was unable to conceive of the company as anything other than a collection of discrete businesses. GE sold much of its consumer electronics business to Thomson of France, arguing that it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain its competitiveness in this sector. That was undoubtedly so, but it is ironic that it sold several key businesses to competitors who were already competence leaders Black & Decker in small electrical motors, and Thomson, which was eager to build its competence in microelectronics and had learned from the Japanese that a position in consumer electronics was vital to this challenge. Management trapped in the strategic business unit (SBU) mind set almost inevitably finds its individual businesses dependent on external sources for critical components, such as motors or compressors. But these are not just components. They are core products that contribute to the competitiveness of a wide range of end products. They are the physical embodiments of core competencies.

How Not to Think of Competence

Since companies are in a race to build the competencies that determine global leadership, successful companies have stopped imagining themselves as bundles of businesses making products. Canon, Honda, Casio, or NEC may seem to preside over portfolios of businesses unrelated in terms of customers, distribution channels, and merchandising strategy. Indeed, they have portfolios that may seem idiosyncratic at times: NEC is the only global company to be among leaders in computing, telecommunications, and semiconductors and to have a thriving consumer electronics business. But looks are deceiving. In NEC, digital technology, especially VLSI and systems integration skills, is fundamental. In the core competencies underlying them, disparate businesses become coherent. It is Honda's core competence in engines and power trains that gives it a distinctive advantage in car, motorcycle, lawn mower, and generator businesses. Canon's core competencies in optics, imaging, and microprocessor controls have enabled it to enter, even dominate, markets as seemingly diverse as copiers, laser printers, cameras, and image scanners. Philips worked for more than 15 years to perfect its optical media (laser disc) competence, as did JVC in building a leading position in video recording. Other examples of core competencies might include mechantronics (the ability to marry mechanical and electronic engineering), video displays, bioengineering, and microelectronics. In the early stages of its competence building, Philips could not have imagined all the products that would be spawned by its optical media competence, nor could JVC have anticipated miniature camcorders when it first began exploring videotape technologies.

Unlike the battle for global brand dominance, which is visible in the

world's broadcast and print media and is aimed at building global \"share of mind,〞 the battle to build world class competencies is invisible to people who aren't deliberately looking for it. Top management often tracks the cost and quality of competitors' products, yet how many managers untangle the web of alliances their Japanese competitors have constructed to acquire competencies at low cost? In how many Western boardrooms is there an explicit, shared understanding of the competencies the company must build for world leadership? Indeed, how many senior executives discuss the crucial distinction between competitive strategy at the level of a business and competitive strategy at the level of an entire company?

Let us be clear. Cultivating core competence does not mean outspending rivals on research and development. In 1983, when Canon surpassed Xerox in worldwide unit market share in the copier business, its R&D budget in reprographics was but a small fraction of Xerox's. Over the past 20 years, NEC has spent less on R&D as a percentage of sales than almost all of its American and European competitors.

Nor does core competence mean shared costs, as when two or more SBUs use a common facility a plant, service facility, or sales force or share a common component. The gains of sharing may be substantial, but the search for shared costs is typically a post hoc effort to rationalize production across existing businesses, not a premeditated effort to build the competencies out of which the businesses themselves grow.

. Building core competencies is more ambitious and different than integrating vertically, moreover. Managers deciding whether to make or buy will start with end products and look upstream to the efficiencies of the supply chain and downstream toward distribution and customers. They do not take inventory of skills and look forward to applying them in nontraditional ways. (Of course, decisions about competencies do provide a logic for vertical integration. Canon is not particularly integrated in its copier business, except in those aspects of the vertical chain that Support the competencies it regards as critical.)

Identifying Core Competencies And Losing Them

At least three tests can be applied to identify core competencies in a company. First, a core competence provides potential access to a wide variety of markets. Competence in display systems, for example, enables a company to participate in such diverse businesses as calculators, miniature TV sets, monitors for laptop computers, and automotive dashboards which is why Casio's entry into the handheld TV market was predictable. Second, a core competence should make a significant contribution to the perceived customer benefits of the end product. Clearly, Honda's engine expertise fills this bill.

Finally, a core competence should be difficult for competitors to

imitate. And it will be difficult if it is a complex harmonization of individual technologies and production skills. A rival might acquire some of the technologies that comprise the core competence, but it will find it more difficult to duplicate the more or less comprehensive pattern of internal coordination and learning. JVC’s decision in the early 1960s to pursue the development of a videotape competence passed the three tests outlined here. RCA’s decision in the late 1970s to develop a stylus based video turntable system did not.

Few companies are likely to build world leadership in more than five or six fundamental competencies. A company that compiles a list of 20 to 30 capabilities has probably not produced a list of core competencies. Still, it is probably a good discipline to generate a list of this sort and to see aggregate capabilities as building blocks. This tends to prompt the search for licensing deals and alliances through which the company may acquire, at low cost, the missing pieces.

Most Western companies hardly think about competitiveness in these terms at all. It is time to take a tough minded look at the risks they are running. Companies that judge competitiveness, their own and their competitors', primarily in terms of the price/performance of end products are courting the erosion of core competencies – or making too little effort to enhance them. The embedded skills that give rise to the next generation of competitive products cannot be \"rented in\" by outsourcing and OEM-supply relationships. In our view, too many companies have unwittingly surrendered core competencies when they cut internal investment in what they mistakenly thought were just \"cost centers\" in favor of outside suppliers. Consider Chrysler. Unlike Honda, it has tended to view engines and power trains as simply one more component. Chrysler is becoming increasingly dependent on Mitsubishi and Hyundai: between 1985 and 1987, the number of outsourced engines went from 252,000 to 382,000. It is difficult to imagine Honda yielding manufacturing responsibility, much less design, of so critical a part of a car's function to an outside company which is why Honda has made such an enormous commitment to Formula One auto racing. Honda has been able to pool its enginerelated technologies; it has parlayed these into a corporatewide competency from which it develops world beating products, despite R&D budgets smaller than those of GM and Toyota.

Of course, it is perfectly possible for a company to have a competitive product line up but be a laggard in developing core competencies at least for a while. If a company wanted to enter the copier business today, it would find a dozen Japanese companies more than willing to supply copiers on the basis of an OEM private label. But when fundamental technologies changed or if its supplier decided to enter the market directly and become a competitor, that company's product line, along with all of its investments in marketing and distribution, could be vulnerable. Outsourcing can provide a shortcut to a more competitive product, but it typically contributes

little to building the people embodied skills that are needed to sustain product leadership.

Nor is it possible for a company to have an intelligent alliance or sourcing strategy if it has not made a choice about where it will build competence leadership. Clearly, Japanese companies have benefited from alliances. They've used them to learn from Western partners who were not fully committed to preserving core competencies of their own. As we've argued in these pages before, learning within an alliance takes a positive commitment of resources- travel, a pool of dedicated people, test bed facilities, time to internalize and test what has been learned. A company may not make this effort if it doesn't have clear goals for competence building.

Another way of losing is forgoing opportunities to establish competencies that are evolving in existing businesses. In the 1970s and 1980s, many American and European companies like GE, Motorola, GTE, Thom, and GEC chose to exit the color television business, which they regarded as mature. If by \"mature\" they meant that they had run out of new product ideas at precisely the moment global rivals had targeted the TV business for entry, then yes, the industry was mature. But it certainly wasn't mature in the sense that all opportunities to enhance and apply video based competencies had been exhausted.

In ridding themselves of their television businesses, these companies failed to distinguish between divesting the business and destroying their video media based competencies. They not only got out of the TV business but they also closed the door on a whole stream of future opportunities reliant on video based competencies. The television industry, considered by many U.S. companies in the 1970s to be unattractive, is today the focus of a fierce public policy debate about the inability of U.S. corporations to benefit from the $20 billion a year opportunity that HDTV will represent in the mid to late 1990s. Ironically, the U.S. government is being asked to fund a massive research project in effect, to compensate U.S. companies for their failure to preserve critical core competencies when they had the chance.

In contrast, one can see a company like Sony reducing its emphasis on VCRs (where it has not been very successful and where Korean companies now threaten), without reducing its commitment to video related competencies. Sony's Betamax led to a debacle. But it emerged with its videotape recording competencies intact and is currently challenging Matsushita in the 8mm camcorder market.

There are two clear lessons here. First, the costs of losing a core competence can be only partly calculated in advance. The baby may be thrown out with the bath water in divestment decisions. Second, since core competencies are built through a process of continuous improvement and enhancement that may span a decade or longer, a company that has failed

to invest in core competence building will find it very difficult to, enter an emerging market, unless, of course, it will be content simply to serve as a distribution channel.

American semiconductor companies like Motorola learned this painful lesson when they elected to forgo direct participation in the 256k generation of DRAM chips. Having skipped this round, Motorola, like most of its American competitors, needed a large infusion of technical help from Japanese partners to rejoin the battle in the 1 megabyte generation. When it comes to core competencies, it is difficult to get off the train, walk to the next station, and then reboard.

From Core Competencies to Core Products The tangible link between identified core competencies and end products is what we call the core products- the physical embodiments of one or more core competencies. Honda's engines, for example, are core products, linchpins between design and development skills that ultimately lead to a proliferation of end products. Core products are the components or subassemblies that actually contribute to the value of the end products. Thinking in terms of core products forces a company to distinguish between the brand share it achieves in end product markets (for example, 40% of the U.S. refrigerator market) and the manufacturing share it achieves in any particular core product (for example, 5% of the world share of compressor output).

Canon is reputed to have an 84% world manufacturing share in desktop laser printer \"engines,\" even though its brand share in the laser printer business is minuscule. Similarly, Matsushita has a world manufacturing share of about 45% in key VCR components, far in excess of its brandshare (Panasonic, JVC, and others) of 20%. And Matsushita has a commanding core product share in compressors worldwide, estimated at 40%, even though its brand share in both the air conditioning and refrigerator businesses is quite small.

It is essential to make this distinction between core competencies, core products, and end products because global competition is played out by different rules and for different stakes at each level. To build or defend leadership over the long term, a corporation will probably be a winner at each level. At the level of core competence, the goal is to build world leadership in the design and development of a particular class of product functionality be it compact data storage and retrieval, as with Philips's optical media competence, or compactness and ease of use, as with Sony's micromotors and microprocessor controls.

To sustain leadership in their chosen core competence areas, these companies seek to maximize their world manufacturing share in core products. The manufacture of core products for a wide variety of external (and

internal) customers yields the revenue and market feedback that, at least partly, determines the pace at which core competencies can be enhanced and extended. This thinking was behind JVC's decision in the mid 1970s to establish VCR supply relationships with leading national consumer electronics companies in Europe and the United States. In supplying Thomson, Thorn, and Telefunken (all independent companies at that time) as well as U.S. partners, JVC was able to gain the cash and the diversity of market experience that ultimately enabled it to outpace Philips and Sony. (Philips developed videotape competencies in parallel with JVC, but it failed to build a worldwide network of OEM relationships that would have allowed it to accelerate the refinement of its videotape competence through the sale of core products.)

JVC's success has not been lost on Korean compames like Goldstar, Sam Sung, Kia, and Daewoo, who are building core product leadership in areas as diverse as displays, semiconductors, and automotive engines through their OEM supply contracts with Western companies. Their avowed goal is to capture investment initiative away from potential competitors, often U.S. companies. In doing so, they accelerate their competence building efforts while \"hollowing out\" their competitors. By focusing on competence and embedding it in core products, Asian competitors have built up advantages in component markets first and have then leveraged off their superior products to move downstream to build brand share. And they are not likely to remain the low cost suppliers forever. As their reputation for brand leadership is consolidated, they may well gain price leadership. Honda has proven this with its Acura line, and other Japanese car makers are following suit.

Control over core products is critical for other reasons. A dominant position in core products allows a company to shape the evolution of applications and end markets. Such compact audio disc related core products as data drives and lasers have enabled Sony and Philips to influence the evolution of the computer peripheral business in optical media storage. As a company multiplies the number of application arenas for its core products, it can consistently reduce the cost, time, and risk in new product development. In short, well targeted core products can lead to economies of scale and scope.

Two Concepts of the Corporation: SBU or Core Competence SBU Core Competence

Basis for competition Competitiveness of today’s products Interfirm competition to build competencies

Corporate structure Portfolio of businesses related in product-market

terms Portfolio of competencies, core products, and businesses

Status of the business unit Autonomy is sacrosanct; the SBU “owns〞 all resources other than cash SBU is a potential reservoir of core competencies

Resource allocation Discrete businesses are the unit of analysis, capital is allocated business by business Businesses and competencies are the unit of analysis: top management allocates capital and talent

Value added of top management Optimizing corporate returns through capital allocation trade-offs among businesses Enunciating strategic architecture and building competencies to secure the future

The Tyranny of the SBU

The new terms of competitive engagement cannot be understood using analytical tools devised to manage the diversified corporation of 20 years ago, when competition was primarily domestic (GE versus Westinghouse, General Motors versus Ford) and all the key players were speaking the language of the same business schools and consultancies. Old prescriptions have potentially toxic side effects. The need for new principles is most obvious in companies the corporation are summarized in \"Two Concepts of the Corporation: SBU or Core Competence.〞

Obviously, diversified corporations have a portfolio of products and a portfolio of businesses. But we believe in a view of the company as a portfolio of competencies as well. U.S. companies do not lack the technical resources to build competencies, but their top management often lacks the vision to build them and the administrative means for assembling resources spread across multiple businesses. A shift in commitment will inevitably influence patterns of diversification, skill deployment, resource allocation priorities, and approaches to alliances and outsourcing. We have described the three different planes on which battles for global leadership are waged core competence, core products, and end products. A corporation has to know whether it is winning or losing on each plane. By sheer weight of investment, a company might be able to beat its rivals to blue sky technologies yet still lose the race to build core competence leadership. If a company is winning the race to build core competencies (as opposed to building leadership in a few technologies), it will almost certainly outpace rivals in new business development. If a company is winning the race to capture world manufacturing share in core products, it will probably outpace rivals in improving product features and the price/performance ratio.

Determining whether one is winning or losing end product battles is more difficult because measures of product market share do not necessarily reflect various companies' underlying competitiveness. Indeed, companies that attempt to build market share by relying on the competitiveness of

others, rather than investing in core competencies and world core-product leadership, may be treading on quicksand. In the race for global brand dominance, companies like 3M, Black & Decker, Canon, Honda, NEC, and Citicorp have built global brand umbrellas by proliferating products out of their core competencies. This has allowed their individual businesses to build image, customer loyalty, and access to distribution channels. When you think about this reconceptualization of the corporation, the primacy of the SBU an organizational dogma for a generation is now clearly an anachronism. Where the SBU is an article of faith, resistance to the seductions of decentralization can seem heretical. In many companies, the SBU prism means that only one plane of the global competitive battle, the battle to put competitive products on the shelf today, is visible to top management. What are the costs of this distortion?

Underinvestment in Developing Core Competencies and Core Products. When the organization is conceived of as a multiplicity of SBUs, no single business may feel responsible for maintaining a viable position in core products nor be able to justify the investment required to build world leadership in some core competence. In the absence of a more comprehensive view imposed by corporate management, SBU managers will tend to underinvest. Recently, companies such as Kodak and Philips have recognized this as a potential problem and have begun searching for new organizational forms that will allow them to develop and manufacture core products for both internal and external customers.

SBU managers have traditionally conceived of competitors in the same way they've seen themselves. On the whole, they've failed to note the emphasis Asian competitors were placing on building leadership in core products or to understand the critical linkage between world manufacturing leadership and the ability to sustain development pace core competence. They've failed to pursue OEM supply opportunities or to look across their various product divisions in an attempt to identify opportunities for coordinated initiatives.

Imprisoned Resources. As an SBU evolves, it often develops unique competencies. Typically, the people who embody this competence are seen as the sole property of the business in which they grew up. The manager of another SBU who asks to borrow talented people is likely to get a cold rebuff. SBU managers are not only unwilling to lend their competence carriers but they may actually hide talent to prevent its redeployment in the pursuit of new opportunities. This may be compared to residents of an underdeveloped country hiding most of their cash under their mattresses. The benefits of competencies, like the benefits of the money supply, depend on the velocity of their circulation as well as on the size of the stock the company holds.

Western companies have traditionally had an advantage in the stock of skills they possess. But, have they been able to reconfigure them quickly

to respond to new opportunities? Canon, NEC, and Honda have had a lesser stock of the people and technologies that compose core competencies but could move them much quicker from one business unit to another. Corporate R&D spending at Canon is not fully indicative of the size of Canon's core competence stock and tells the casual observer nothing about the velocity with which Canon is able to move core competencies to exploit opportunities. When competencies become imprisoned, the people who carry the competencies do not get assigned to the most exciting opportunities, and their skills begin to atrophy. Only by fully leveraging core competencies can small companies like Canon afford to compete with industry giants like Xerox. How strange that SBU managers, who are perfectly willing to compete for cash in the capital budgeting process, are unwilling to compete for people the company's most precious asset. We find it ironic that top management devotes so much attention to the capital budgeting process yet typically has no comparable mechanism for allocating the human skills that embody core competencies. Top managers are seldom able to look four or five levels down into the organization, identify the people who embody critical competencies, and move them across organizational I boundaries.

Bounded Innovation. If core competencies are not recognized, individual SBUs will pursue only those innovation opportunities that are close at hand marginal product line extensions or geographic expansions. Hybrid opportunities like fax machines, laptop computers, hand held televisions, or portable music keyboards will emerge only when managers take off their SBU blinkers. Remember, Canon appeared to be in the camera business at the time it was preparing to become a world leader in copiers. Conceiving of the corporation in terms of core competencies widens the domain of innovation.

Developing Strategic Architecture

The fragmentation of core competencies becomes inevitable when a diversified company's information systems, patterns of communication, career paths, managerial rewards, and processes of strategy development do not transcend SBU lines. We believe that senior management should spend a significant amount of its time developing a corporatewide strategic architecture that establishes objectives for competence building. A strategic architecture is a road map of the future that identifies which core competencies to build and their constituent technologies.

By providing an impetus for learning from alliances and a focus for internal development efforts, a strategic architecture like NEC’s C&C can dramatically reduce the investment needed to secure future market leadership. How can a company make partnerships intelligently without a clear understanding of the core competencies it is trying to build and those it is attempting to prevent from being unintentionally transferred?

Of course, all of this begs the question of what a strategic architecture should look like. The answer will be different for every company. But it is helpful to think again of that tree, of the corporation organized around core products and, ultimately core competencies. To sink sufficiently strong roots, a company must answer some fundamental questions: How long could we preserve our competitiveness in this business if we did not control this particular core competence? How central is this core competence to perceived customer benefits? What future opportunities would be foreclosed if we were to lose this particular competence?

The architecture provides a logic for product and market diversification, moreover. An SBU manager would be asked: Does the new market opportunity add to the overall goal of becoming the best player in the world? Does it exploit or add to the core competence? At Vickers, for example, diversification options have been judged in the context of becoming the best power and motion control company in the world (see the insert \"Vickers Learns the Value of Strategic Architecture\").

The strategic architecture should make resource allocation priorities transparent to the entire organization. It provides a template for allocation decisions by top management. It helps lower level managers understand the logic of allocation priorities and disciplines senior management to maintain consistency. In short, it yields a definition of the company and the markets it serves. 3M, Vickers, NEC, Canon, and Honda all qualify on this score. Honda knew it was exploiting what it had learned from motorcycles how to make high revving, smooth running, lightweight engines when it entered the car business. The task of creating a strategic architecture forces the organization to identify and commit to the technical and production linkages across SBUs that will provide a distinct competitive advantage.

It is consistency of resource allocation and the development of an administrative infrastructure appropriate to it that breathes life into a strategic architecture and creates a managerial culture, teamwork, a capacity to change, and a willingness to share resources, to protect proprietary skills, and to think long term. That is also the reason the specific architecture cannot be copied easily or overnight by competitors. Strategic architecture is a tool for communicating with customers and other external constituents. It reveals the broad direction without giving away every step.

Redeploying to Exploit Competencies

If the company's core competencies are its critical resource and if top management must ensure that competence carriers are not held hostage by some particular business, then it follows that SBUs should bid for core

competencies in the same way they bid for capital. We've made this point glancingly. It is important enough to consider more deeply.

Once top management (with the help of divisional and SBU managers) has identified overarching competencies, it must ask businesses to identify the projects and people closely connected with them. Corporate officers should direct an audit of the location, number, and quality of the people who embody competence.

This sends an important signal to middle managers: core competencies are corporate resources and may be reallocated by corporate management. An individual business doesn't own anybody. SBUs are entitled to the services of individual employees so long as it is pursuing yields the highest possible pay off on the investment in their skills. This message is further underlined if each year in the strategic planning or budgeting process, unit managers must justify their hold on the people who carry the company's core competencies.

Elements of Canon's core competence in optics are spread across businesses as diverse as cameras, copiers, and semiconductor lithographic equipment and are shown in \"Core Competencies at Canon.〞 When Canon identified an opportunity in digital laser printers, it gave SBU managers the right to raid other SBUS to pull together the required pool of talent. When Canon's reprographics products division undertook to develop microprocessor-controlled copiers, it turned to the photo products group, which had developed the world's first microprocessor controlled camera. Also, reward systems that focus only on product line results and career paths that seldom cross SBU boundaries engender patterns of behavior among unit managers that are destructively competitive. At NEC, divisional managers come together to identify next generation competencies. Together they decide how much investment needs to be made to build up each future competency and the contribution in capital and staff support that each division will need to make. There is also a sense of equitable exchange. One division may make a disproportionate contribution or may benefit less from the progress made, but such short term inequalities will balance out over the long term.

Incidentally, the positive contribution of the SBU manager should be made visible across the company. An SBU manager is unlikely to surrender key people if only the other business (or the general manager of that business who may be a competitor for promotion) is going to benefit from the redeployment. Cooperative SBU managers should be celebrated as team players. Where priorities are clear, transfers are less likely to be seen as idiosyncratic and politically motivated.

Transfers for the sake of building core competence must be recorded and appreciated in the corporate memory. It is reasonable to expect a business that has surrendered core skills on behalf of corporate opportunities in other areas to lose, for a time, some of its

competitiveness. If these losses in performance bring immediate censure, SBUs will be unlikely to assent to skills transfers next time.

Finally, there are ways to wean key employees off the idea that they belong in perpetuity to any particular business. Early in their careers, people may be exposed to a variety of businesses through a carefully planned rotation program. At Canon, critical people move regularly between the camera business and the copier business and between the copier business and the professional optical products business. In midcareer, periodic assignments to cross divisional project teams may be necessary both for diffusing core competencies and for loosening the bonds that might tie an individual to one business even when brighter opportunities beckon elsewhere. Those who embody critical core competencies should know that their careers are tracked and guided by corporate human resource professionals. In the early 1980s at Canon, all engineers under 30 were invited to apply for membership on a seven person committee that was to spend two years plotting Canon's future direction, including its strategic architecture.

Competence carriers should be regularly brought together from across the corporation to trade notes and ideas. The goal is to build a strong feeling of community among these people. To a great extent, their loyalty should be to the integrity of the core competence area they represent and not just to particular businesses. In traveling regularly, talking frequently to customers, and meeting with peers, competence carriers may be encouraged to discover new market opportunities.

Core competencies are the wellspring of new business development. They should constitute the focus for strategy at the corporate level. Managers have to win manufacturing leadership in core products and capture global share through brand building programs aimed at exploiting economies of scope. Only if the company is conceived of as a hierarchy of core competencies, core products, and market focused business units will it be fit to fight.

Nor can top management be just another layer of accounting consolidation, which it often is in a regime of radical decentralization. Top management must add value by enunciating the strategic architecture that guides the competence acquisition process. We believe an obsession with competence building will characterize the global winners of the 1990s. With the decade underway, the time for rethinking the concept of the corporation is already overdue.

Vickers Looms the Value of Strategic Architecture

The idea that top management should develop a corporate strategy for acquiring and deploying core competencies is relatively new in most U.S. companies. There are a few exceptions. An early convert was Trinova (previously Libbey Owens Ford), a Toledo based corporation, which enjoys a worldwide position in power and motion controls and engineered plastics. One of its major divisions is Vickers, a premier supplier of hydraulics components like valves, pumps, actuators, and filtration devices to aerospace, marine, defense, automotive, earth moving, and industrial markets.

Vickers saw the potential for a transformation of its traditional business with the application of electronics disciplines in combination with its traditional technologies. The goal was \"to ensure that change in technology does not displace Vickers from its customers.〞 This, to be sure, was initially a defensive move: Vickers recognized that unless it acquired new skills, it could not protect existing markets or capitalize on new

growth opportunities. Managers at Vickers attempted to conceptualize the likely evolution of (a) technologies relevant to the power and motion control business, (b) functionalities that would satisfy emerging customer needs, and (c) new competencies needed to creatively manage the marriage of technology and customer needs.

Despite pressure for short term earnings, top management looked to a 10 to 15 year time horizon in developing a map of emerging customer needs, changing technologies, and the core competencies that would be necessary to bridge the gap between the two. Its slogan was \"Into the 21st Century.\" (A simplified version of the overall architecture developed is shown here.) Vickers is currently in fluid power components. The architecture identifies two additional competencies, electric power components and electronic controls. A systems integration capability that would unite hardware, software, and service was also targeted for development.

The strategic architecture, as illustrated by the Vickers example, is not a forecast of specific products or specific technologies but a broad map the evolving linkages between customer functionality requirements, potential technologies, and core competencies. It assumes that products and systems cannot be defined with certainty for the future by the preempting competitors in the development of new markets requires an early start to building core competencies. The strategic architecture developed by Vickers, while describing the future in competence terms, also provides the basis for making “here and now〞 decisions about product priorities, acquisitions, alliances, and recruitment.

Since 1986, Vickers has made more than ten clearly targeted acquisitions, each one a specific component or technology gap identified in the overall architecture. The architecture is also the basis for internal development of new competencies Vickers has undertaken, in parallel, a reorganization to enable the integration of electronics and electrical capabilities with mechanical based competencies. We believe that it will take another two to three years before Vickers reaps the total benefits from developing the strategic architecture, communicating it widely to all its employees, customers, and investors and building administrative systems consistent with the architecture.