Political corruption
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
In broad terms, political corruption is the use of governmental powers by government officials for illegitimate private gain. Misuse of government power for other purposes, such as repression of political opponents and general police brutality, is not considered political corruption. Neither are illegal acts by private persons or corporations not directly involved with the government. An illegal act by an officeholder constitutes political corruption only if the act is directly related to their official duties.
All forms of government are susceptible to political corruption. Forms of corruption vary, but include bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement. While corruption may facilitate criminal enterprise such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and trafficking, it is not restricted to these organized crime activities. In some nations, corruption is so common that it is expected when ordinary businesses or citizens interact with government officials. The end point of political corruption is a kleptocracy, literally \"rule by thieves\".
The activities that constitute illegal corruption differ depending on the country or jurisdiction. Certain political funding practices that are legal in one place may be illegal in another. In some countries, government officials have broad or poorly defined powers, and the line between what is legal and illegal can be difficult to draw.
Bribery around the world is estimated at about $1 trillion (£494bn), and the burden of corruption falls disproportionately on the bottom billion people living in extreme poverty.
Effects
Effects on politics, administration, and institutions
Corruption poses a serious development challenge. In the political realm, it undermines democracy and good governance by flouting or even subverting formal processes. Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies reduces accountability and distorts representation in
policymaking; corruption in the judiciary compromises the rule of law; and corruption in public administration results in the unfair provision of services. More generally, corruption erodes the institutional capacity of government as procedures are disregarded, resources are siphoned off, and public offices are bought and sold. At the same time, corruption undermines the legitimacy of government and such democratic values as trust and tolerance.
Economic effects
Corruption also undermines economic development by generating considerable distortions and inefficiency. In the private sector, corruption increases the cost of business through the price of illicit payments themselves, the management cost of negotiating with officials, and the risk of breached agreements or detection. Although some claim corruption reduces costs by cutting red tape, the availability of bribes can also induce officials to contrive new rules and delays. Openly removing costly and lengthy regulations are better than covertly allowing them to be bypassed by using bribes. Where corruption inflates the cost of business, it also distorts the playing field, shielding firms with connections from competition and thereby sustaining inefficient firms.
Corruption also generates economic distortions in the public sector by diverting public investment into capital projects where bribes and kickbacks are more plentiful. Officials may increase the technical complexity of public sector projects to conceal or pave way for such dealings, thus further distorting investment. Corruption also lowers compliance with construction, environmental, or other regulations, reduces the quality of government services and infrastructure, and increases budgetary pressures on government.
Economists argue that one of the factors behind the differing economic development in Africa and Asia is that in the former, corruption has primarily taken the form of rent extraction with the resulting financial capital moved overseas rather invested at home (hence the stereotypical, but often accurate, image of African dictators having Swiss bank accounts). In Nigeria, for example, more than $400 billion was stolen from the treasury by Nigeria's leaders between 1960 and 1999. University of Massachusetts researchers estimated that from 1970 to 1996, capital flight from 30 sub-Saharan countries totaled $187bn, exceeding those nations' external debts. (The results, expressed in retarded or suppressed development, have been modeled in theory by economist Mancur Olson.) In the case of Africa, one of the factors
for this behavior was political instability, and the fact that new governments often confiscated previous government's corruptly-obtained assets. This encouraged officials to stash their wealth abroad, out of reach of any future expropriation. In contrast, corrupt administrations in Asia like Suharto's have often taken a cut on everything (requiring bribes), but otherwise provided more of the conditions for development, through infrastructure investment, law and order, etc.
Environmental and social effects
Corruption facilitates environmental destruction. Although even the corrupt countries may formally have legislation to protect the environment, it cannot be enforced if the officials can be easily bribed. The same applies to social rights such as worker protection, unionization and prevention of child labor. Violation of these laws and rights enables corrupt countries to gain an illegitimate economic advantage in the international market.
As the Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen has observed that \"there is no such thing as an apolitical food problem.\" While drought and other naturally occurring events may trigger famine conditions, it is government action or inaction that determines its severity, and often even whether or not a famine will occur. Governments with strong tendencies towards kleptocracy can undermine food security even when harvests are good. The 20th century is full of many examples of governments undermining the food security of their own nations – sometimes intentionally.
Types of abuse Bribery
Bribery requires two participants: one to give the bribe, and one to take it. In some countries the culture of corruption extends to every aspect of public life, making it extremely difficult for individuals to stay in business without resorting to bribes. Bribes may be demanded in order for an official to do something he is already paid to do. They may also be demanded in order to bypass laws and regulations. In some developing nations, up to half of the population have paid bribes during the past 12 months.
Graft
While bribery includes an intent to influence or be influenced by another for personal gain, which is often difficult to prove, graft only requires that the official gains something of
value, not part of his official pay, when doing his work. Large \"gifts\" qualify as graft, and most countries have laws against it. (For example, any gift over $200 value made to the President of the United States is considered to be a gift to the Office of the Presidency and not to the President himself. The outgoing President must buy it if he wants to take it with him.) Another example of graft is a politician using his knowledge of zoning to purchase land which he knows is planned for development, before this is publicly known, and then selling it at a significant profit. This is comparable to insider trading in business.
Extortion and robbery
Main articles: Extortion and Robbery
While bribes may be demanded in order to do something, payment may also be demanded by corrupt officials who otherwise threaten to make illegitimate use of state force in order to inflict harm. This is similar to extortion by organized crime groups. Illegitimate use of state force can also be used for outright armed robbery. This mostly occurs in unstable states which lack proper control of the military and the police. Less open forms of corruption are preferred in more stable states.
Government officials, especially if involved in illegal activities, are also liable to extortion, both by senior corrupt officials or other criminals. These develop over time into complicated networks of corruption, where law enforcement merely serves as a way to discredit and destroy. The anti-corruption effort is not immune to corruption either: there are examples of cases where officials of an anti-corruption bureau have extorted sums from corrupt officials.
Patronage
Patronage refers to favoring supporters, for example with government employment. This may be legitimate, as when a newly elected government changes the top officials in the administration in order to effectively implement its policy. It can be seen as corruption if this means that incompetent persons, as a payment for supporting the regime, are selected before more able ones. In nondemocracies many government officials are often selected for loyalty rather than ability. They may be almost exclusively selected from a particular group (for example, Sunni Arabs in Saddam Hussein's Iraq, the nomenklatura in the Soviet Union, or the Junkers in Imperial Germany) that support the regime in return for such favors.
Conditions favorable for corruption
Some argue that the following conditions are favorable for corruption: Information deficits
Lack of government transparency.
Lacking freedom of information legislation. The Indian Right to Information Act 2005 has \"already engendered mass movements in the country that is bringing the lethargic, often corrupt bureaucracy to its knees and changing power equations completely.\"
Contempt for or negligence of exercising freedom of speech and freedom of the press. Weak accounting practices, including lack of timely financial management.
Lack of measurement of corruption. For example, using regular surveys of households and businesses in order to quantify the degree of perception of corruption in different parts of a nation or in different government institutions may increase awareness of corruption and create pressure to combat it. This will also enable an evaluation of the officials who are fighting corruption and the methods used.
Tax havens which tax their own citizens and companies but not those from other nations and refuse to disclose information necessary for foreign taxation. This enables large scale political corruption in the foreign nations.
Lacking control over and accountability of the government. Democracy absent or dysfunctional. See illiberal democracy.
Lacking civic society and non-governmental organizations which monitor the government.
An individual voter may have a rational ignorance regarding politics, especially in nationwide elections, since each vote has little weight.
Weak rule of law. Weak legal profession. Weak judicial independence. Lacking protection of whistleblowers.
Lack of benchmarking, that is continual detailed evaluation of procedures and comparison to others who do similar things, in the same government or others, in particular
comparison to those who do the best work. The Peruvian organization Ciudadanos al Dia has started to measure and compare transparency, costs, and efficiency in different government departments in Peru. It annually awards the best practices which has received widespread media attention. This has created competition among government agencies in order to improve.
Opportunities and incentives Individual officials routinely handle cash, instead of handling payments by giro or on a separate cash desk — illegitimate withdrawals from supervised bank accounts are much more difficult to conceal.
Public funds are centralized rather than distributed. For example, if $1,000 is embezzled from local agency that has $2,000 funds, it easier to notice than from national agency with $2,000,000 funds. See the principle of subsidiarity.
Large, unsupervised public investments. Sale of state-owned property and privatization. Poorly-paid government officials.
Government licenses needed to conduct business, e.g., import licenses, encourage bribing and kickbacks.
Long-time work in the same position may create relationships inside and outside the government which encourage and help conceal corruption and favoritism. Rotating government officials to different positions and geographic areas may help prevent this.
Costly political campaigns, with expenses exceeding normal sources of political funding. Less interaction with officials reduces the opportunities for corruption. For example, using the Internet for sending in required information, like applications and tax forms, and then processing this with automated computer systems. This may also speed up the processing and reduce unintentional human errors. See e-Government.
A windfall from exporting abundant natural resources may encourage corruption. Social conditions
Self-interested closed cliques and \"old boy networks\".
Family-, and clan-centered social structure, with a tradition of nepotism being acceptable.
A gift economy, such as the Chinese guanxi or the Soviet blat system, emerges in a
Communist centrally planned economy.
In societies where personal integrity is rated as less important than other characteristics (by contrast, in societies such as 18th and 19th century England, 20th century Japan and post-war western Germany, where society showed almost obsessive regard for \"honor\" and personal integrity, corruption was less frequently seen)
Lacking literacy and education among the population. Size of public sector
It is a controversial issue whether the size of the public sector per se results in corruption. Extensive and diverse public spending is, in itself, inherently at risk of cronyism, kickbacks and embezzlement. Complicated regulations and arbitrary, unsupervised official conduct exacerbate the problem. This is one argument for privatization and deregulation. Opponents of privatization see the argument as ideological. The argument that corruption necessarily follows from the opportunity is weakened by the existence of countries with low to non-existent corruption but large public sectors, like the Nordic countries. However, these countries score high on the Ease of Doing Business Index, due to good and often simple regulations, and have rule of law firmly established. Therefore, due to their lack of corruption in the first place, they can run large public sectors without inducing political corruption.
Privatization, as in the sale of government-owned property, is particularly at the risk of cronyism. Privatizations in Russia and Latin America were accompanied by large scale corruption during the sale of the state owned companies. Those with political connections unfairly gained large wealth, which has discredited privatization in these regions. While media have reported widely the grand corruption that accompanied the sales, studies have argued that in addition to increased operating efficiency, daily petty corruption is, or would be, larger without privatization, and that corruption is more prevalent in non-privatized sectors. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that extralegal and unofficial activities are more prevalent in countries that privatized less.
In the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity is applied: a government service should be provided by the lowest, most local authority that can competently provide it. An effect is that distribution of funds into multiple instances discourages embezzlement, because even small sums missing will be noticed. In contrast, in a centralized authority, even minute
proportions of public funds can be large sums of money.
Governmental corruption
If the highest echelons of the governments also take advantage from corruption or embezzlement from the state's treasury, it is sometimes referred with the neologism kleptocracy. Members of the government can take advantage of the natural resources (e.g., diamonds and oil in a few prominent cases) or state-owned productive industries. A number of corrupt governments have enriched themselves via foreign aid, which is often spent on showy buildings and armaments.
A corrupt dictatorship typically results in many years of general hardship and suffering for the vast majority of citizens as civil society and the rule of law disintegrate. In addition, corrupt dictators routinely ignore economic and social problems in their quest to amass ever more wealth and power.
The classic case of a corrupt, exploitive dictator often given is the regime of Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko, who ruled the Democratic Republic of the Congo (which he renamed Zaire) from 1965 to 1997. It is said that usage of the term kleptocracy gained popularity largely in response to a need to accurately describe Mobutu's regime. Another classic case is Nigeria, espeicially under the rule of General Sani Abacha who was de facto president of Nigeria from 1993 until his death in 1998. He is reputed to have stolen some US$3-4 billion. He and his relatives are often mentioned in Nigerian 419 letter scams claiming to offer vast fortunes for \"help\" in laundering his stolen \"fortunes\which in reality turn out not to exist.[12] More than $400 billion was stolen from the treasury by Nigeria's leaders between 1960 and 1999.
More recently, articles in various financial periodicals, most notably Forbes magazine, have pointed to Fidel Castro, General Secretary of the Republic of Cuba since 1959, of likely being the beneficiary of up to $900 million, based on \"his control\" of state-owned companies. Opponents of his regime claim that he has used money amassed through weapons sales, narcotics, international loans and confiscation of private property to enrich himself and his political cronies who hold his dictatorship together, and that the $900 million published by Forbes is merely a portion of his assets, although that needs to be proven.
Campaign contribution
In the political arena, it is difficult to prove corruption. For this reason, there are often unproved rumors about many politicians, sometimes part of a smear campaign.
Politicians are placed in apparently compromising positions because of their need to solicit financial contributions for their campaign finance. If they then appear to be acting in the interests of those parties that funded them, this gives rise to talk of political corruption. Supporters may argue that this is coincidental. Cynics wonder why these organizations fund politicians at all, if they get nothing for their money.
Laws regulating campaign finance in the United States require that all contributions and their use should be publicly disclosed. Many companies, especially larger ones, fund both the Democratic and Republican parties. Certain countries, such as France, ban altogether the corporate funding of political parties. Because of the possible circumvention of this ban with respect to the funding of political campaigns, France also imposes maximum spending caps on campaigning; candidates that have exceeded those limits, or that have handed misleading accounting reports, risk having their candidacy ruled invalid, or even be prevented from running in future elections. In addition, the government funds political parties according to their successes in elections. In some countries, political parties are run solely off subscriptions (membership fees).
Even legal measures such as these have been argued to be legalized corruption, in that they often favor the political status quo. Minor parties and independents often argue that efforts to rein in the influence of contributions do little more than protect the major parties with guaranteed public funding while constraining the possibility of private funding by outsiders. In these instances, officials are legally taking money from the public coffers for their election campaigns to guarantee that they will continue to hold their influential and often well-paid positions.
Measuring corruotion
Measuring corruption statistically is not a straightforward matter, since the participants are generally not forthcoming about it. Transparency International, a leading anti-corruption NGO, provides three measures, updated annually: a Corruption Perceptions Index (based on experts' opinions of how corrupt different countries are); a Global Corruption Barometer (based on a survey of general public attitudes toward and experience of corruption); and a
Bribe Payers Survey, looking at the willingness of foreign firms to pay bribes.
The World Bank collects a range of data on corruption, including a set of indicators of governance and institutional quality. Moreover, one of the six dimensions of governance measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators is Control of Corruption, which is defined as \"the extent to which power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests.\" Based on this definition the Worldwide Governance Indicators project has developed aggregate measurements for the level of control of corruption in more than 200 countries.
The ten countries perceived to be least corrupt, according to the 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index, are Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, Iceland, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, and Norway.
According to the same survey, the nine countries perceived to be most corrupt are Somalia, Myanmar, Iraq, Haiti, Uzbekistan, Tonga, Sudan, Chad, and Afghanistan.
In the U.S., the top five most corrupt states are Louisiana, Mississippi, Kentucky, Alabama, and Ohio, according to a 2007 study by Corporate Crime Reporter (based on U.S. Department of Justice data on public convictions).
政治腐败
英文文章来源：自由百科全书
http地址：http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_corruption
广义上, 政治腐败是政府官员利用政府力量为自己或他人谋取非法收益的行为。 政府力量被误用为其它目的, 譬如抑制政治对手和常规警察的残酷行为，不被认为政治腐败。由私人或组织不直接地被介入以政府都不是非法行动。公务员的非法行为只有在这种行为与官员职责有关时才构成政治腐败。所有的政府表现都易受政治腐败的影响。腐败形式的变化, 主要包括贿赂、贪污、任人唯亲、裙带关系、光顾、贪占, 和盗用。
腐败促进犯罪的滋生，譬如毒品交易, 洗钱等等 ,同时它也不受限于这些组织犯罪活动。在一些国家, 腐败是如此常见以至普通企业或公民与政府官员相处融洽成了人们的期望。政治腐败终点是“政治盗窃”, \"字面是由窃贼统治\" 。构成腐败的非法活动因国家（地区）或辖区的不同而有所不同。一个安排的某些政治资助的实践在某一地方是法定的，到了另外一些地方也许就是非法的。在一些国家（地区）, 政府官员有广泛或很有限的力量,但合法与非法的界定依然很难被定义。 贿赂在世界估计在大约$1兆(494bn)，腐败的间接费用被不均衡地分摊到了生活在社会底层的十亿人的团体。
影响
1、对政治、管理, 和机构的作用
腐败构成了一个严肃的发展挑战。在政治领域, 它破坏民主和良好的统治甚至推翻社会正式进程。腐败在竞选中表现为减少责任、立法机关在制订政策时任意变形政策法规；在司法领域减弱法规的效力；在公共管理方面导致服务不合理的提供。更常见的是, 腐败腐蚀政府协会的能力犹如规章的被忽视,资源被吸出, 并且公职被采购和被卖出。同时, 腐败严重的破坏了政府的合法性。
2、对经济的影响
腐败通过生成可观的畸变和无效用从而破坏经济发展。在私营部门, 腐败因为违法付款的价格, 与官员谈判的费用, 和违反协议风险等增加商业的费用。
虽然一些经济腐败减少了“多个公章”费用, 但贿款的可用性直接降低了官员对策划新规则的可能性。很明显，省去繁琐的行政程序所发去的费用比绕过贿款直接行贿要有效得多。因此，腐败对经济的影响不仅是膨胀了商业的费用, 同时它也改变了商场规则。腐败并且通过牵制有更加丰富贿款和佣金的资本项目的公共投资，从而，在公共部门生成经济畸变。官员也许增加了隐瞒公共部门项目的技术从而也为他们以后的腐败铺平了道路, 接下来的是进一步变形投资。腐败降低了对建筑, 环境, 或其它管理规定的严格依照, 降低了政府的服务和基础设施的质量, 和并且增加预算压力在政府。
经济学家争辩说, 在亚洲和非洲的不同经济发展前后，其中一个因素显示，腐败主要采取了租金提取的形式，把收效的财务资本转移到国外而不是在内部投资。 (尽管刻板,但经常是准确的, 非洲独裁者会有瑞士银行帐户) 。在尼日利亚, 例如, 在1960 年和1999 年之间超过$4000亿被尼日利亚的领导从金融管理系统被窃取。马萨诸塞大学的研究人员估计，从1970年到1996年，在30 撒哈拉以南非洲国家的资本外逃总额为187bn，超过这些国家的外债，（结果,迟钝的和被压制的表达, 已经被经济学家Mancur Olson打造成了理论蓝本)，在非洲, 主要的一个因素是政治不稳定,而新任政府总会查收前任的腐败资产。这鼓励官员把他们的财富转移到海外,为了不可企及的未来而肆意征用土地。相反, 腐败管理在亚洲经常采取剪切一切(要求贿款)的做法,像Suharto's。但同时以别的方式提供更多条件发展, 如：通过基础设施投资、治安等。
3、对环境和社会作用
腐败，加快了对环境的破坏。虽然，腐败的国家可以通过正式立法来保护环境，但如果官员可以很容易地被行贿，立法工作就无法被很好的执行。这同样适用于社会的权利，如工人的保护， 工会和预防使用童工 。违反这些法律和权利，在国际市场上能使腐败的国家获得合法的经济优势。
作为诺贝尔奖得主 ，经济学家阿马蒂亚森已指出，“有没有这样的事，作为一个非政治化的粮食问题”。同时，干旱和其他自然发生的事件可能是引发饥荒的原因，但政府的作为或不作为，对饥荒的发生也往往具有很大的影响，甚至是饥荒能否发生。各国政府对政治盗窃的强烈倾向能破坏粮食安全 ，即使是丰收的时候。20世纪有很多例子，一些国家的政府，破坏他们自己的国家的粮食安全-有时是故意的。
腐败的类型: 1、贿赂
贿赂要求二个参与者: 一个给予贿款者, 和一个收取汇款者。在一些国家（地区）腐败文化延伸到公共生活的每个方面, 甚至它使每个人无法单独立于贿赂之外而单独存在。
贿赂也许被需求当请求官员做之前已经承诺为他支付的事情。他们也许被需求是为了绕过某些法律和管理规定。在一些发展中国家, 在过去的一年间，有一半的人承认曾经支付过汇款。
2、行贿
行贿时包括一个意图，即为私有收益去影响或被某个人影响, 这时个人利益经常很难证明, 行贿的发生只要求官员获取某些价值, 而这些价值不是他的正式薪水一部分, 当做他的工作。大\"礼品\" 合格作为贪占, 并且多数国家（地区）有法律反对它。(例如, 任一礼品$200被做对美国总统认为是礼品对总统的职务办公室而不是对总统。即将离任的总统必须采购它如果他想要获得它。) 行贿另外的实例是一位政客使用他的知识分区采购他知道对发展的地产, 在这公共为人所知之前, 并且然后卖出计划它在重大赢利。这与知情人的商业贩卖是相类似的。
3、强夺和盗窃
当贿款也许被需求是为了做某事, 付款也许是必须的，否则，将无法避免因腐败官员对地方权力的滥用所带来的伤害。这与有组织的犯罪集团的强夺是相似。对地方权力的非法使用可能演变为彻底的持械抢劫。这主要发生在缺乏军人和警察的适当的控制的不稳定状态。而在稳定状态会较少显现出腐败。政府官员, 特别是如果介入了非法活动, 那么，他们对强夺是有义务的, 无论是前任腐败官员或者其它罪犯。这些随时间发展成复杂的腐败网络, 执法仅仅担当抹黑和破坏的作用很难有实际效果反腐败工作效果显示，他们对腐败并不是免疫的:：有反贪局官员从腐败官员案件中敲诈的实例。
4、举荐
举荐指倾向支持者, 例如，政府雇佣。这也许是合法的, 因为一个新建当选政府在管理是为了有效实施其制度而更改高级官员。假如这届政府是无能的而纳税人完全可以选择政府管理上更为贤能的人，那么，这也可以看作是一种腐败。如果在非民主国家，许多政府官员经常被选择因为忠诚度而不是能力。他们也许几乎完全从一个特殊组织了被挑选（例如, 逊尼派教徒阿拉伯人在萨达姆・侯赛因的伊拉克, 共产党政府在苏联）来组成政权以换取民众的支持。
腐败发展的有利条件
有些人争论以下条件对腐败是有利的: 1、信息赤字
政府信息缺乏缺乏透明度。
缺乏资讯自由的法例。印地安人2005 年的信息法案上有\"在一些国家和地区，已经形成的正带来毫无生气的群众运动, 通常腐败官僚已经达到其膝盖和正更改着力量等式。\"
蔑视或疏忽行使言论自由和新闻自由。 薄弱的会计实务, 包括缺乏实时性财务管理。
缺乏腐败的评定。例如, 为了定量腐败程度在同一国家的不同地区，不同政府机构而对家庭和企业的正常调查也许增进了人们对腐败的认识，也创建了与它交战压力。这并且也将启用对官员腐败的评估。
避税。他们自己的公民和公司的避税而不是那些来自其它国家的市民，并为外部纳税拒绝透露必要信息。这导致了在外部国家的大规模政治腐败。
2、缺乏控制和政府的问责性。 民主的缺席或功能失调；
缺乏公民社会和非政府组织对政府的监察；
个别选民就政治可能有一个理性的无知，特别是在全国性选举时，因为每次投票时都没有多大的重量。
微弱的法规。 薄弱的司法独立 。 缺乏举报者保护。
缺乏基准, 基准是对与其他人做相似的事而比较连续的详细的评估。在同样政府或其他地方, 特别是与那些做最佳工作的人的比较。秘鲁人组织Ciudadanos al Dia 开始在不同的政府部门评定和比较透明度、费用, 和效率用。它年年被授予最佳实践而受到了普遍媒体注意。这在政府机构之中创建了为了改善的竞争。
3、机会和奖励。
各自的例行公事处理现金, 而不是由转帐服务或在一分开的收银处处理付款。 \"从被监督的银行帐户的非法撤退变得更难隐瞒。
公共基金集中而不是被分配。例如, 如果$1,000 被盗用从有$2,000 笔资金的地方机关, 它将比从全国机构盗取$2,000,000 笔资金更加容易注意。
未加监督的公共投资。 出售国有财产和私有化。 不善支付政府官员。
政府许可需要进行的业务，如进口许可证 ，鼓励贿赂和回扣。
在同样位置长期工作也许因创设的内部和外部的政府关系，积极鼓励和帮助隐瞒腐败和任人唯亲。旋转政府官员不同的立场和地理区域可能有助于防止这种情况出现。
昂贵的政治运动 ，开支超过正常来源的政治资金。
与官员较少的互动也能减少腐败的机会。举例来说，利用互联网传送所需的资料，如申请和税务表格，然后加工，不但能加快处理，并减少无意的人为错误，从出口丰富自然资源获得横财，可能会助长腐败。
4、社会条件
自私的闭合的派系和\"老生网络\" 。
家庭，宗族为中心的社会结构，与传统的裙带关系被接受的。
礼品经济 ，例如，中国广西或苏联blat系统，出现在共产主义中央计划经济。在社会中，个人操守的重要性被评为不亚于其他特点（相比之下，在社团，如18世纪和19世纪的英国，20世纪的日本和战后西方德国 ，并在那里社会表明，几乎为“荣誉”和人格完整痴迷，腐败是少见的）。
公共部门的大小
这是一个争议性的问题，是否腐败是公共部门的规模本身的结果。广泛和多样的公共开支是，在本身内在风险下的任人唯亲，回扣和挪用公款。复杂的规章和独断，监督公务的制度缺失，使问题恶化。这是私有化和放松管制的一个论据私有化见的论点的反对者，从意识形态上抵制。有人称有人称，腐败随着一种国家存在机会的削弱而降低，这种国家有着低到不存在的腐败和庞大的公共部门如北欧国家 。但是，这些国家的对方便做生意的指数的评分高，由于良好的，而且往往简单的规例，法治体系却能牢固的确立，他们的缺乏腐败当居功至伟，他们可以运行大型的公共部门而不会诱导政治腐败。
私有化，因为出售政府拥有的财产，尤其是在风险中的任人唯亲。私有化在俄罗斯和拉丁美洲人出售国有公司时往往伴有大规模腐败。这些由于与政治不公平的联系而取得的财富，在这些地区都存在着无信用的私有化。.虽然媒体已广泛报导了隐藏在销售下的严重的腐败，研究认为，在除了增加经营效率、微小的腐败，或较大的私有化，腐
败在非私有化的部门是也更为普遍。此外，有证据表明，在私有化的少的国家，法外处决和非官方的活动更为普遍。
在欧洲联盟，补贴原则是适用于：一，政府服务应提供最低的，而大部分地方当局能够胜任提供它；另一项实施是把资金分配到的多个实例阻止贪污，因为即使是小的款项的失踪也会被注意到。相比之下，在一个过于集权的政府，即使是公共资金中很微小的部分也会是很大的数额。
政府腐败
如果最高层政府也利用从从国家的国库中贪污或挪用公款， 它也可以被称作“政治盗窃”。政府成员可以利用的天然资源 （例如，钻石和石油在未来数突出的案件）或国有企业有生产能力的行业一些腐败的政府，通过外国援助丰富了自己，而这些援助经常用在华而不实的建筑物和武器装备。腐败的独裁的结果，通常在多年的一般困难和痛苦，最终表现为广大公民和民间社会和法治的瓦解。
另外, 腐败独裁者在他们定期地的搜寻累积更多财富和力量时忽略经济和社会问题。
典型的腐败案件，蒙博托元帅托塞塞塞科，被看作是剥削独裁者的经典。他统治刚果民主共和国 （他改名为扎伊尔 ）从1965年至1997年。据说术语kleptocracy的流行，主要是在响应需要准确地描述蒙博托政权。
另一个典型的例子是尼日利亚，尤其是在Sani Abacha 的统治下，从1993 年直到他的死亡Sani Abacha1是尼日利亚事实上总统他被誉为已经成功偷取了3-4亿美元。他和他的亲属是经常提到的在尼日利亚419诈骗信 ，声称能“帮助”洗黑钱，并可提供广大的财富，而现实却并不如此。在1960年直1999年间，四百多亿元被库务由尼日利亚的领导人偷去。
最近，文章在各类金融期刊，最显着的福布斯杂志指向了卡斯特罗——自1959年以来古巴共和国秘书长。由他控制的国有公司收益高达九亿元。反对他的政权声称，他通过出售武器，毒品，国际贷款和没收私人财产积累金钱，以丰富自己和他的政治亲信，并且福布斯认为9亿美元仅仅是他的资产的一部分，尽管这需要加以证明。
竞选募捐
在政界, 腐败是难证明的。因此, 有经常未被证明关于许多政客的谣言, 有时包括一部分的不正当竞选。政客被安置在明显地妥协的位置，这是由于他们对财政资助来完成他们的市场活动财务。如果他们接下来的行动为他们的资助当事人所感兴趣, 那么这
就提升了政治腐败的可能性。支持者也许争辩说这只是巧合，讽世者惊奇为什么这些组织资助政客, 如果他们从他们的货币里什么也得不到？美国市场活动法律要求, 所有摊缴和他们的用途应该向公共透露。
许多公司, 尤其是较大公司,同时资助民主党和共和党。某些国家（地区）, 譬如法国, 取缔公司同一公司同时资助两个以上政党的行为。考虑到此禁令对竞选的危害，法国政府给竞选强加了最大消费限制; 对超出了那些限额, 或递了引入歧途的会计科目报告的候选人取消其候选人本次参选资格，甚至取消未来几年内的竞选资格。另外, 政府资助政党要根据他们在竞选中的成功。他们经常倾向政治现状的法律措施譬如这些被争论是合法化的腐败,
腐败评定
评定的腐败统计不是一件直接的事情, 因为参与者通对此并不坦白。
透明国际是一家领先的反腐败非政府组织，提供三个方案且年年更新: 腐败征收索引(根据不同的国家（地区）专家的意见)；全球腐败晴雨表(根据公众对腐败的态度和经验调查)；贿款付款人调查, 看外国公司支付贿款的态度。世界银行收集关于腐败的数据的范围, 其中包括一套指标的治理和体制的质量 。
世界银行的收集数据的范围就腐败现象 ，其中包括一套指标的治理和体制的质量 。此外，其中的六个层面的管治来衡量全球治理指标，控制腐败，这是界定为“在何种程度上行使权力为谋取私利，既包括琐碎和严重形式的腐败行为，以及'捕获'国家”。在全球治理指标定义的基础上，对200多个国家的腐败程度利用项目开发总结测量的水平，进行了评估。
十国家（地区）被认定是腐败最少的国家, 根据2007 年腐败征收索引, 是丹麦、芬兰、新西兰、新加坡、瑞典、冰岛、荷兰、瑞士、加拿大, 和挪威。根据同样调查, 八国家（地区）被认定是腐败最为严重的，依次是：索马里、伊拉克、海地、乌兹别克斯坦、汤加、苏丹、乍得,、阿富汗。在美国,五个最腐败的州是路易斯安那、密西西比、肯塔基、阿拉巴马, 和俄亥俄。
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